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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Government, in recent years, has come to be looked upon as 
a positive force in the promotion of the general welfare of society. 
There has been a sharp increase in the demands for governmental 
services from most segments of the political community" As a 
result of these demands, there has been a widening of the scope and 
an increase in the responsibilities of government at all levels. 
These increases in activity have called for new governmental 
financial resources which all states have come to recognize as being 
quite burdensome to provide" 
This study is concerned with a government service which only 
recently has become an added responsibility of state government. 
Economic, political and governmental interests call upon state govern-
ments to provide services which will promote industrial development. 
Business and industrial interest quite naturally desire an increase 
in economic activity which will enhance their own enterprise. Also, 
politicians, responding to the various political pressures in the state, 
and sensing a competitive spirit in relation to surrounding states, 
have taken an interest in the problem. Those who have assumed the 
responsibilities of government have come to see in industrial de-
velopment a means cif broadening the State's tax base which will in 
turn provide much needed revenues, Today, all fifty states have 
governmental agencies designed to promote industrial development. 
Oklahoma created its first department level industrial agency, 
2· 
the Department of Commerce and Industry, in February of 1955. Prior 
to 1955, state promotion of industrial development.was the responsi-
bility of a branch of the Planning and Resources Board known as the 
Division of State and Industrial Planning. The latter agency was 
considered to be ineffective. Consequently, Governor Gary, a Democrat, 
took the lead in the establishment of the Department of Commerce and 
Industry and won overwhelming support from the legislature in the 
process, However, after Governor Gary left office, the Department 
began to experience difficulty. Governor J. Howard Edmondson, who 
followed Gary was also a Democrat; however, he was not able to get 
the cooperation of the dominate forces in the state legislature. The 
fortunes of the Governor seemed to be directly related to the De-
partment's existence. The Department's difficulties with the 
legislature were compounded by the mishandling of departmental funds 
by Max Genet, Governor Edmondson's Director. 
Under Governor Henry Bellmon, who succeeded Governor Edmondson, 
legislative hostility toward the Department became more intense. This 
hostility was aggravated by Bellman's appointment of New England Re-
publican, Lloyd Allen, to the post of Director. By 1965 legislative 
hostility climaxed in the abolishment of the Department of Commerce 
and Industry through its merger with the Oklahoma Planning and 
Resources Board. Conversations with legislative leaders indicate the 
1965 change is not the last one. Additional change can be expected 
during the next session of the legislature in 1967. 
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Obviously, Oklahoma has had considerable difficulty in establishing 
a functioning io.dustrial development agency, It is the purpose of this 
study to explore the political controversy surrounding the agency in 
order to determine the impact of political conflict upon the creation 
I 
and operation. of such an agency. This, of course, assumes that the 
establishment of a functioning state industrial development agency 
is a desirable goal. 
Fundamental questions guiding the course of this study have been: 
(1) What were the political circumstances under which legislation 
authorizing the creation of a state industrial development agency was 
enacted? (2:) What were the political circumstances under which legis-
lation was enacted merging the Department of Commerce and Industry 
with the Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board? (3) Does the funda-
mentally weak character of the Oklahoma executive branch of government 
in its relations with the legislative branch have a bearing on the 
problem? (4) Does the fundamental structure of the Oklahoma in-
dustrial development agency complicate the political environment in 
which it must function? 
It is the hypothesis of this study that partisan politics has 
prevented the development of an effective industrial development 
agency as an institution of state government in Oklahomaj which today 
is considered to be essential for industrial development. 
This study is based primarily upon information obtained through 
interviews with numerous individuals concerned with the creation, 
operation and alteration of the Oklahoma industrial development agency. 
Included among the interviewees were Governor Bellmon; Speaker of the 
Oklahoma House of Representatives, J, D, McCarty; Senate President Pro 
Tempore, Clem McSpadden; past and present Directors of the Oklahoma 
industrial development agency and others who had a part in the affairs 
of the agency. 
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The literature on state government and politics was also explored. 
Unfortunately, there was very little material available giving in-
formation or thought on the state industrial development agency, 
though all 50 states possess an agency of one kind or another. 
Correspondence with industrial development authorities in the states 
of Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico and Colorado pro-
vide a description of the structure of each state 1 s agency. Pertinent 
Oklahoma documents and leading Oklahoma newspapers were also consulted. 
In order to have a frame of reference for analyzing the Oklahoma 
industrial development agencies a model agency was constructed, This 
agency was constructed on the basis of the experience of the Oklahoma 
agency and similar agencies in surrounding states. An attempt was made 
to construct a model which would, under reasonable political conditions, 
insulate the industrial development agency against the vicissitudes of 
day-to-day politics. This is developed in Chapter II after the general 
need for a state industrial development agency is explored. 
Chapter III deals with the rise and demise of the Department of 
Commerce and Industry. Particular attention is focused on such 
questions as the reasons for its establishment, the nature of its 
structure, and the scope and technique of the Department's operation 
and reasons for its eventual merger with the Planning and Resources 
Board. 
In Chapter IV an attempt is made to reveal the political forces 
which were responsible for the alteration of the Oklahoma agency. 
Attention is focused upon the political nature of the merger in an 
attempt to discover the degree of partisan political manipulation of 
the development agencyo 
The fifth chapter provides a summary and conclusions as to why 
the attempt to establish a properly functioning Oklahoma industrial 
development agency has failedo 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPT OF STATE GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING 
STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES 
The scope of governmental activity and responsibility has 
increased many fold during recent years. Although such expansion has 
been greater at the national level, the scope of state government has 
also become greater and greater. Today, it is rather commonly be-
lieved that state governments have a responsibility for providing 
public education, adequate highway systems, assistance for public 
welfare, health and housing facilities, in addition to many other 
general services. Government has come to be viewed as a positive 
force in the promotion of the general welfare, Consequently, it is 
not surprising to discover that all of the 50 states have recently 
established some type of governmental agency to promote industrial 
development. 
As may be expected in a democratic system of government, the 
involvement of government entails the involvement of many political 
forces, The concert of these political forces determines the scope 
and nature of various public institutions which are established for 
the benefit of society. Thus, when state industrial development 
agencies are established, their relationship to the executive and 
legislative bodies is a direct Tesult of a particular relationship of 
the general political power of the respective branches of government. 
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It is a general theory of American government that technical 
executive agencies should be established in such a manner that they 
are able to perform their technical function without undue direct 
political interferenceo Since industrial development agencies are 
primarily concerned with a highly technical function, it is believed 
that their operation should not be subject to the forces of everyday 
politicso 
From the outset it should be acknowledged that the attempt to 
eliminate politics from industrial development agencies does not 
mean that such agencies should not be held responsible to publicly 
elected officialso Rather, by the elimination of politics it is meant 
that it is desirable to create an atmosphere in which industrial de-
velopment agencies are able to carry out their function in a pro,-
fessional manner rather than serving as an agency directly subject 
to the dominate political forces at a given moment whether legislative 
or executive in origino 
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Thus, it is the primary purpose of this chapter to focus attention 
on the reason for the establishment of industrial development agencies 
and how such agencies may best be organized so as to accomplish their 
fundamental task--the promotion of industrial developmento 
Reasons for State Involvement 
Perhaps the most commonly shared characteristic of state 
governments in the United States during the 1960's is their common 
financial predicamento States throughout the nation have become 
extremely hard-pressed to keep up with "the rapid increase in the 
demand for state services. Most pressing have been the increasing 
costs of education ~nd highway construction and maintenance, 
During recent years, educational costs have rise_n: s_harply due 
to a large increase in the number within the school-age group. This 
expansion has been manifest throughout all levels of the education 
system. During 1964, 
the total expenditures for public elementary and secondary 
schools advanced $1.5 billion to a total of $21.2 billion. 
In the last decade, total school expenditures have increased 
at an average annual growth rate of 8.8 per cent compared 
with a rate of 5.3 per cent increase in gross national 
product,l 
Educational expansion is equally as burdensome in higher education. 
Educational experts predict 
enrollments in colleges and universities will be 
approximately doubled within ten years. This ex-
pansion cannot be financed by m!;!rely doubling the 
operating income of the institutions. When the point 
is reached where there are twice as many students as 
now, the annual income will have to be about three times 
what it is now.2 
Likewise, with the enormous increase in the number of automobiles 
in use today, it has become more and more difficult for the states to 
provide adequate highway. systems. As an indication of the proportions 
of this problem, the .federal government es_timates that it will spend 
$41 billion to provide a 41,_000 mile Interstate Higp,way System. "A 
1961 study estimated $1 million a mile for 528 miles of unallocated 
111Financial Status of the Public Schools, 1964," National 
Education Association Journal, LIII, November, 1964, p. 38. 
211Rising Costs in Higher Education,." School and Society, XCI, 
October 5, 1963, pp. 272-274. 
8 
highways, mostly in urban areas. This has now proved to fall 
3 
substantially short. 11 
Thus, as is indicated through observing only these two items, 
educational and highway costs, state financing has become a real 
challenge to state government in the 1960°s. 
It is in those states where industrial development is still 
in primitive stages that state financing has become most acute. In 
such states as agrarian Oklahoma, political office seekers of varying 
political philosophies and party affiliation quite typically remarj:e 
"The financing of state government is the major problem facing the 
4 
next governor • ." 
The industrially underdeveloped states, such as Oklahoma, often 
are required to allocate a large portion of their annual budgets to 
the operation of educational programs. Official budgetary statistics 
reveal that the Twenty-ninth Oklahoma Legislature {1.96i] appropri-
ated $169,303,963.68 for educational purposes; while the second 
largest item was a highway appropriation of $18,499,000 from a State 
budget totaling $256,713,719.35. 5 As these stat is.tics indicate, 
Oklahoma is required to set aside a large percentage of its budget in 
order to meet the requirements of public education. Yet, it has had 
difficulty coping with the burdensome demands of this rapidly 
311Road Costs Go Higher/' Business Week, December 5, 1964, p. 84. 
4statement by gubernatorial candidate Fred R, Harris as quoted 
in The Daily Oklahoman, April 10, 1962. 
5oklahoma, Budget, for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1966-67. 
These figures are the amount appropriated from the General Revenue 
Fund. 
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increasing service as indicated by the National Education Associations' 
invocation of nsanctions" against the Oklahoma public school system 
during 1965. 
Faced with problems of this magnitude, states have sought to 
discover new sources of revenue. Expansion of taxable income through 
industrial development has been one of the primary methods by which 
states have sought to improve their financial plight. Consequently, 
during recent gubernatorial campaigns in Oklahoma, candidates have 
often remarked: 110klahorna must broaden its economic base if the people 
expect to keep up with surrounding states,.,,, 116 Or, "We must broaden 
the tax base and increase the number of taxpayers. This can only be 
done through new jobs. So I pledge to be a full time governor working 
to bring industry and tourists to Oklahorna. 117 
Remarks such as those cited abov·e are based on expectations which 
stern from estimates developed by organizations such as the United 
States Chamber of Commerce concerning the effect of industrial de-
velopment. For instance: 
As the Chamber found in a recent study, a new factory with 
100 jobs available brings in 359 new people to a town, 100 
added households, $710,000 in additional spending power, 
$129,000 in new bank despoits, and $331,000 spent in local 
stores,8 
6staternent by gubernatorial candidate Fred R, Harris as quoted 
in The Daily Oklahoman, January 25, 1962, 
?statement by gubernatorial candidate George Nigh as quoted 
in The Daily Oklahoman, April 10, 1962, 
811The Big Plant-Site Scramble," Dun's Review and Modern Industry, 
LXXXIII, No, 3, March 1964, p. 105, 
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Realizing the potential of industrial development as an additional 
source of revenue, state govermre nts have established governmental 
a'gencies to assist in the promotion of industrial advancement with 
basically a two-fold purpose: Expansion of existing .industry, and the 
attraction of new industry. It is the thinking .of many ·in state 
government that professional agencies can have much to do with the 
decision of management concerning ~he location of new plants. Similarly, 
state officials believe that such agencies can be especially effective 
in attracting large defense or space related industries. Consequently, 
many state industrial development agencies have been established 
specifically to .take advantage of the expanding defense and space 
expenditures of the federal government. Gigantic projects such as the 
national Aeronautics and Space Agency's center at Houston, .Texas, can 
provide a rich source of revenue sorely needed by state governments. 
In addition, it is believed that presently existing industry can be 
encouraged to expand through the guidance and assistance of state 
supported industrial development agencies. 
By the end of 1965, industrial development had become a vital and 
commonly established function of state government. "All fifty states 
L;r':] for the first t,ime, fully committed to the conduct O·f broad de-
velopment programs through state agencies supported with state tax 
funds. 119 Due to their dire need for additional revenue, the states 
have become embroiled in fierce competition for the location of in-
dustry within their borders. Several states are diverting large 
9H. McKinley Conway, Jr., "State Development Programs," The 
Book of the States 1964-65, XV, Chicago, 1964, .p. 486. 
amounts of capital and manpower to their drive for expanded 
industrialization. For example, reports show that the State of New 
York has an economic development budget of $4 million with a staff of 
326 full time employees, while F1orida 1 s budget for fiscal 1965 was 
10 $2.9 million with a staff of 284 employees. Thus, industrial de-
velopment has become a big operation. As Dun's Review describes it, 
·never before has the competition among cities and communities 
across the nation to get -in on today's onrush of plant ex-
pansion and movement been so great. As capital-investment 
programs are pushed through boards of directors at a record-
rate, promotional campaigns by states and local communities 
are likewise burgeoning. 
Indeed there are now no less than 20,000 area develop-
ment organizations throughout the United States with just 
one thing in mind: Luring .industry within the areas they 
represent~ll 
Industrial development agencies have not always been created for 
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the primary purpose of promoting expansion; .states, because of the keen 
competition that has developed~ have to be concerned with preserving 
what they have, Officials from New Mexico express -it this way:. 
The fact that we are making a maximum effort to attract 
industries to New Mexico from other s.tates does .not make 
industries already situated here immune to ,the overtures 
of industrial development interests of other states. 12 
Thus, the state industrial development agency must not only be con-
cerned with attracting industry but must also concern.itself with 
the preservation of existing industry. This is particularly true 
in a relatively industrialized state such as Texas. Such states have 
lOibid,, p. 487. 
ll"The Big Plant-Site Scramble," Dun's Review and Modern Industry, 
LXXXIII, No. 3, March, 1964, p. 105. 
12 Annual Report 1965 New Mexico Department of Development, p. _28 
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been [orcetl to develop extensive state industrial development agencies 
and programs in order to prevent industry from leaving their state. 
This is illustrated by the recent action of the Texas Industrial 
Commission. On June 16, 1966, the Commission resolved "to recommend to 
the Governor and to the next session of the Legislature a state-wide 
13 
industrial financing program." According to the resolution, the 
Industrial Commission has b,2en forced to act because "most other states 
in the nation have some form of public financing program making for 
14 
extremely active competition for industrial locations." 
For whatever the reasons, states are actively involved in 
providing assistance to efforts of industrial development and ex-
pansion. No longer may a state be content with "natural" industrial 
growth. 
The Proper Function of the Industrial 
Development Agency 
There are two general concepts as to the proper scope and function 
of state industrial development agencies which are in use today. One 
concept holds that the state industrial development agency should 
shoulder primary responsibility for the locating of industry and that 
industrial development should be approached primarily from the pro-
motional angle. Adherents of this conception of industrial development 
invision the state agency as a department of state government which 
13 
Personal correspondence with Mr. Alvin A. Burger, Executive 
Director of the Texas Research League, Austin, Texas, July 1, 1966. 
14raken from a press release dated for release June 16, 1966, 
under the name of the executive director of the Texas Industrial 
Commission, Harry W. Clark. 
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collects enough data to send out a crew of field representatives to 
"sell" an industrial firm on locating within its borders" It is be-
lieved that personal persuasion such as the "wining and dining" of 
company executives is essential to industrial growth. The proper scope 
of this type of s.tate agency is all encompassing. Such an agency is 
responsible for establishing contact with firms who are interested in 
seeking new locations. Likewise, it is the state agency which handles 
the negotiations with the industrial firm including the recommending 
of specific potential industrial sites within the state. 
A second concept of the proper function of the state industrial 
development agency is one in which the state agency is conceived as 
an agency preforming a more passive and supplementary role" Adherents 
of this type of development agency view its role as primarily that 
of channeling needed information to the local communities or regions of 
the state. It is the function of the state development agency to dis-
cover those industrial firms which are planning to relocate or expand 
their plant facilities. When such information is obtained, the state 
agency relays vital statistical information to chambers of commerce and 
other local groups throughout the entire state" Negotiation with the 
industrial firm then becomes the responsibility of the individual 
communities. Once contact has been made with an "interested" firm, the 
state development agency moves out of the picture unless specifically 
requested by the community or communities involved to provide 
additional assistance. 
It is the primary responsibility of the "supplementing-
coordinating" type of industrial development agency to prepare the 
local groups for effective negotiation. The state agency coordinates 
the gathering and preparation of data that will be necessary .in the 
connnunity's efforts to locate any industry. 
The priinary objective of the state industrial development agency 
is .to provide ef.fective assistance to those connnunities seeking 
industrial plants. Perhaps the most effective approach for the state 
agency is to let the local connnunities of the various ·regions of the 
state assume the responsibility for expanding their present industry 
and bringing new industry into the state. The state agency should 
assume a ·suppo:rting ;t:6le:. '-Such :recommendation is ·expressed .ip. the 
remarks ·of,Dean Richard Poole when he said that basically a state 
industrial development agency should be an agency 
providing information and research support---not a big state 
staff to do the actual research. As far as being an ag-
gressive group to bringin industry, it probably should not 
attempt anything other than being on the lookout .... It 
should perform a supporting role. Let the local groups do 
the actual asking after they have discovered th!t a certain 
industry is .interested in corning to the State .1 
There a.re two principle advantages to the "supplementing-
coordinating" concept. First, under the more passive approach, the 
possibility of the agency becoming involved in controversies which 
concern charges of favoritism toward a particular connnunity is mini-
mized. Whereas, with the state development agency doing the actual 
15 
promoting and reconnnending of specific sites, any connnunity that looses 
out in the struggle to get an industry may place the blame on the state 
agency. Also, when the state agency _is assuming such ai major role, 
15personal interview with Dr. Richard Poole, Dean of the College 
of Business, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, March 8, 
1966, 
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local chambers of commerce may attempt to keep any contact which they 
have with an industrial firm a highly guarded secret for fear that the 
state agency might "sabotage" their efforts by recommending another 
site. This creates a highly undesirable situation since it may be that 
the city or town has need ci£ additional technical information which 
only the state industrial development agency has access to through its 
extensive res.earch activities. 
A second advantage of the more passive approach to state 
industrial development is that it reduces the possibility of getting 
the state agency involved in conflicts with s.tate legislators over 
who should receive credit for the locating of new plants within the 
state. With the state agency working primarily as a coordinating 
agency, both the state industrial development agency and the local 
chambers of commerce can claim mutual success from their joint 
efforts. However, when there is present a situation in which the state 
industrial development agency .is spending a great deal of money for 
extensive travel, the state legislature may expect the agency to be 
able to account for its expenditures with specific results. This 
demand often causes the state industrial development agency to become 
too selfish in its cliams and consequently leads to hostilities 
between state and .local industrial development groups. This problem 
becomes more significant in the state in which the executive branch 
is weak, This specific problem is explored in relation to_Oklahoma's 
Industrial Development and Park Department late;r in this study. 
17 
General Operation of the Agency 
Generally the agency should be capable of gathering and assembling 
information which is considered vital to industrial expansion. This 
would normally include such vital statistics as climate, water re-
sources, waste disposal, transportation, power, fuel, labor,resources~. 
legislation relative to industry and tax information. Be.fore any 
industrial firm will consider locating within a state, it must be 
supplied with all statistics necessary for it, to ascertain the 
feasibility of such a project. 
It is the responsibility of the state industrial development 
agency to ,supply that information which is neeqed by a particular 
community in its negotiations with an industrial firm. The state 
agency should be ready and willing to provide any necessary information 
upon request by the local community. The state agency's function 
should be primarily one of supplying the local community with vital 
statistics concerning both the needs of the firm and the industrial 
assets of the community. The effect of such an operation is to pre-
pare the local community with information which allows ,it to supply 
prompt and proper answers. Such ability becomes important when 
dealing with business e~ecutives. 
An additional responsibility of the state agency should be that 
of encouraging the expansion of industry already located within the 
state. Thus, the state agency should take steps to develop sta-
tistical studies revealing .the availability of new markets for an 
industry's products. Armed with such knowledge, the state agency may 
succeed in encouraging local industries to vastly expand their level 
of product-ion. 
The industrial development agency .must develop a great deal of 
professional competence. In times past there was less demand for the 
highly skilled industrial development expert. However, Dun's Review 
repQrts that the trend of today is towa:rd a much higher degree of pro-
fessionalism on the part of the sta.te development agency . 
... blue-sky inducements are often viewed with suspicion 
by companies seeking new locations for plants. l'The 
farther out the offers," says one, "the more desperate 
the conununity. And the more suspicious we are. They 
usually are desperate for a good reason. 11 16 
It has been discovered that the more desirable industrial firms are 
more responsive to:a clear and simple exposition of the locale·' s 
virtues. Such:a trend was noted as early as 1962 when the Book of 
the States 1962-63.reported: "There has been a trend away from 
dependence on door-bell ringing for industrial'prospects. 1117 
Several companies have discovered after their acceptance of some 
of the more enticing incentives that the entire situation was not 
portrayed by the state development agency's promotional propaganda. 
Dun's Review reports such happenings as an industry moving to a 
town on the basis of an agreement that the local conununity would pro-
vide a 12-inch water main for the firm's operational needs only to 
later discover that the water main had no water. A few other inci-
dents such as this have caused industrial firms to place less and 
16 Dun's Review and Modern Industry, LXXXII, No • .3, March, 1964, 
p •. 144. 
17Harold V. Miller, "State Planning and Development,!' Book £f the 
States 1962-63, XIV, Chicago, 1962, p. 454. 
less reliance upon the unsophisticated development agency. Today 
state development agencies are being called upon to provide 
a higher level of professional services. .The economic 
feasibility study is replacing the idle claim. Graduate 
engineers and economists are being added to ~taffs and 
many groups ~re ~ow ready£§ make techno-economic studies 
for prospective investors. 
The Texas Research League 19 has made specific recommendations as 
19 
to what the proper function of the state industrial development agency 
should be, The League's recommendations are based upon research .into 
some of the weaknesses of similar agencies in,Jother states, Thus, such 
recommendations may be viewed as guidelines for the model state de-
velopment agency. The recommendations of the League include the 
following: 
--The agency should serve as a clearing house for technical 
data which can be used effectively by private industrial 
location executives, 
--The L;tate developmen~/ agency should work with prospects 
only.until such time as they can be turned over to com-
.·.·petent industrial development executives at the local 
level. 
--Where no development personnel exist at the local level 
or if the prospect specifically requests that the state 
agency remain in the picture, .then :the agency might 
participate in actual placement; these situations should 
be few in .. number, 
.--The agency should work with smaller communities to help 
them organize resources and leadership for attracting 
arXiLho lding smaller industries. 
--The Commission must not "sell" one region or community 
over another. 
18Ibid., p. 487. 
19The Texas Research League is a privately supported non-profit 
educational corporation engaged in research into the operations of 
Texas government. The League's offices are located at 403 East 15th 
Street, Austin, Texas. 
--The Commission and its staff should not attempt extensive 
out-of-state travel unless such travel cannot be made 
conveniently or effectively by private industrial de-
velopment executives.20 
The Model Industrial Development Agency 
20 
'Lt is a generai tJ:j.elJry of gl:>vernment tp.at administration properly 
belongs outside the sphere of politics. However, politics and adminis-
tration undoubtedly will intermingle since administrative acts will 
often involve judgments which excite politics. Nevertheless, adminis-
tration and general policy-making ought to be kept separate to the 
extent that it is possible. 21 Thus, it is generally considered to 
be most desirable in the establishment of administrative agencies to 
employ the principle of "neutral competence''. 
Although the industrial development of a state may become 
politically significant, the primary function of state industrial 
development agencies does not involve basic policy-making. Industrial 
development agencies must be equipped with a high degree of technical 
competence. Most of their work concerns only the technical aspects 
of industrial development. Therefore, it is not necessary to:sul:iJec:t 
such an operation to the day-to day vicissitudes of politics. .Thus, 
the question which arises is: What should be the proper relationship 
between the industrial development agency and the states legislative 
and executive branches? What constitutes the most desirable 
arrap.gement for achieving this relatively new and complex task? 
· 
20Texas Research League Analyzes State Encouragement for Industrial 
Growth, .Texas Research Legaue, Austin, Texas, March, 1962, p . .2. 
21ouane ·Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government, 
(New York, 1963), p. 335. 
Prior to answering this question, certain qualifying remarks 
should be made. There is no known publication outlining a model in-
dustrial development agency. The only publications available which 
are concerned with problems of this nature are materials such as the 
Council of State Government's Book of the States. Bascially 1 this is 
nothing more than a biennial report of the general trends of de-
velopment in the several states. Although the Book of the States 
indica·te:s that there is a national organization known as the Associ-
ation of State Planning and Development Agencies, this Association 
has not made any specific recommendations concerning the structuring 
of a development agency. 22 In order to have a more systematic basis 
for analyzing the Oklahoma agency, a model or ideal agency has been 
constructed. It is based on the study of several agencies found in 
surrounding states. Since this study is concerned primarily with 
the problem of political relationships between the industrial de-
velopment agency, the legislature and the governor, the emphasis in 
the model agency focuses on these relationshps. .No attempt is made 
21 
to develop a model organization in reference to the technical problems 
concerned in the promotion of industrial expansion. 
If day-to-day politics is to be prevented from interfering with 
the technical function of the development agency, it must be structured 
22The Association of State Planning and Development Agencies is 
an organization created for the purpose of coordinating the activities 
of the various states in this field and is staffed by people who are 
involved in such activities within the several states, All ef£orts to 
communicate with the Association have failed. The Association did not 
respond to a letter of inquiry nor was it possible to establish contact 
via telephone. Apparently, it does not maintain executive offices at 
its Washington, D. C. address. 
so that such forces are.held at some distance from its operation. It 
is thought that such a goal can be accomplished by establishing a 
governing board or connnission which would be responsible for shaping 
the specific policies for industrial development and generally super-
vise the agency's operation. The connnission should be responsible for 
hiring and firing the a.gency' s director who would in turn assume com-
plete responsibility for the administrative operation of the agency. 
There should be no direct relationship between the ~econd-echelon 
policy-makers and the connnission. .These individuals should be hired 
by the director. The only check on the director is that of making 
him responsible for the performance of the agency. 
Th,e g_overning connnission should be crea.ted in a manner which 
relates to the political forces bearing upon the operation of the 
development agency. One of the principle reasons .for establishing 
this commission is to create a political-shock absorber for the 
industrial development agency._ However,,_ in_ otdet_ to insu1ate,:the 
development ;agency .firo.ril.'political ,interference it is also necessary 
to provide protection for the connnission. .It is thought that the 
connnission can be most effectively protected by structuring it in a 
manner which includes the major political forces of the state in its 
organization. Consequently, _the governing connnission should be nomi-
nated by the governor and confirmed by the state senate. Such a 
method of appointment should serve to neutralize potential legis-
lative hostility toward the commissions-' operation since legislators 
will be partially responsible for the commissioners presence. 
The commission should consist of an odd numbered membership of 
five to nine members. The membership should not be so large that it 
22 
becomes unwieldy; however, it should be large enough to represent an 
adequate cross-section of the state. Although it might be wise for a 
governor to nominate commissioners who represent various sections of 
the state, there is no reason to restrict his appointments to certain 
numbers from specific sections of the state. Industrial development 
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is a technical function which must be approached on a state-wide basis. 
The commission should be established in a manner which prevents 
. a governor from gaining control of a majority of the membership during 
a single term of office. This goal can best be accomplished by making 
the commissioners' terms longer than that of the governor and through 
the creation of a staggered expiration of terms feature . 
. Another feature which should aid in the establishment of an agency 
which is politically independent of both the governor and the legis-
lature is a provision that the commission must have a bi-partisan 
membership. This may be accomplished through legislation-.which pro-
vides that the commission's membership shall be of such nature so that 
there is never more than one over a majority of members of a certain 
political affiliation. Such a requirement is beneficial in that it 
provides a safeguard for preventing legislative attack merely on the 
basis of the political affiliation of the membership. Experience has 
shown that this has been one of the major weaknesses of such 
commissions. 
In order to provide protection from gubernatorial interference, 
the commissioners should be subject to removal only through the legis-
lative impeachment process. A commission with these features should 
be able to realize a measure of political independence from both the 
governor and the legislature. 
The Relationship Between Strong Executive Branches 
and Effective Development Agencies? 
Any meaningful discussion and evaluation of the general nature 
and effectiveness of state industrial development agencies must be 
preceded by a general knowledge of the power of the states' executive 
branches. There seems to be a relationship between "strong1123 
executive branches and "effective1124 industrial development agencies, 
When compared with other state governments, it becomes quite obvious 
that Oklahoma's chief executive does not meet the standards of a 
strong executive suggested by the Council of State Governments. The 
Council sets forth the position that: ''The governor bridges the gap 
24 
between policy and administration--indeed if the governor is operating 
upon his proper level and the two become indistinguishable.1125 
The executive branch in Oklahoma, while being nominally under 
the governor's direction, actually is divided among several different 
elected department or agency heads. Each of them, of course, answer 
to his constituents and not to the governor. A study conducted by 
the Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkel 
23 
"Strong" as used in this discussion has reference to the general 
strength of the executive branch vis-a-vis the legislature. Without 
going into an elaborate discussion, those states in which the general 
executive function is performed at the discretion of executive officials 
rather than legislators will be considered as "strong". 
24 
"Effective" industrial development agencies will generally be 
those which play a major role or generally are able to perform their 
statutorily defined role in the establishment of new industry. 
25council of State Governments, Reorganizing State Government, 
(Chicago, 1950), p .. 10. 
26 
reveals some interesting comparative data concerning this problem. 
First, comparing state executive functions which are performed by 
officials selected by means of popular election based upon state con-
25 
stitutional requirements, Oklahoma ranked highest of the 50 states with 
17 state executive functions being controlled by popularly elected 
officials. The next closest states were Louisiana, Michigan, and North 
Dakota with each state having 11. 27 The actual number of executive 
officials selected by means of popular vote was 32 in Oklahoma, 24 in 
Michigan, 23 in Louisiana, and 22 in Nebraska. 
Secondly, a comparison of the appointment powers o.f governors in 
reference to offices concerned with 16 categories of functions--
Administration and Finance, Agriculture, Attorney General, Auditor, 
Budget Officer, Conservation, Controller, Education, Health, Highways, 
Insurance, Labor, Secretary of State, Tax Commission, Treasurer, and 
Welfare--reveals the following: (a) In the category of appointment 
of these officials solely by the governor, Oklahoma had one appointment 
while 50 per cent of the states had two or more. Tennessee ranked 
highest with 11, while Maryland and Indiana each had eight such 
appointments, (b) In the category of the governor appointing the 
executive officials subject to the approval of one legislative body, 
Oklahoma had one while 74 per cent of the states had two or more, New 
Jersey ranked highest with 13, while Hawaii and Pennsylvania had 12 and 
26Earl L, Darrah and Orville F, Poland, The Fifty State Governments: 
A Compilation of Executive Organization Charts, (October, 1961), 
27statistics appearing in this study were gathered during .1961, 
Since that time, Michigan has had major constitutional reform which 
basically increased the power of the executive branch vis-a-vis the 
state legislature, 
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11, respectively. Only 16 per cent of the states, including Oklahoma, 
did not have more than two executive categories which were appointed 
solely by the governors or with the approval of one house of the state 
legislatureso (c) Only seven states, including Oklahoma, did not have 
more than two categories which were either filled through some combi-
nation of the methods described above or by gubernatorial appointment 
subject to the approval of both legislative bodies. (d) In the 
category in which the respective executive officials are appointed by 
the director or governing executive board subject to confirmation by 
the governor, Oklahoma had none, while Massachusetts had 11, Maine 10, 
and New Hampshire 8. 
In summary, the University of California study reveals that only 
four states, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Delaware, and Colorado had less 
than three of the 16 categories analyzed in which appointments were 
made solely by the governor, by the governor in cooperation with the 
state legislatures or through the governor's approval of appointments 
made by an executive agency's action. 28 On the basis of these compari-
sons, it is almost an understatement to simply label Oklahoma's governor 
as "weak". This study is supported by the report of the Council of 
State Government which revealed as early as 1950 that, "undoubtedly one 
of the main trends of recent political history.o.has been the growth 
. . "f" f h h" f . 1129 in signi icance o t e c ie executive. However, as late as 1966, 
Oklahoma's chief executive still is not functioning within the 
28 
Darrah and Poland, Table 6. 
29council of State Governments, Reorganizing State Government, 
(Chicago, 1950),-p. 9. 
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mainstream of such a trend. Oklahoma's governor remains hamstrung by 
his lack of effective control over many of the so-called executive 
agencies. This results in the governor having only limited influence 
over the executive branch and creates a situation which complicates 
his relationship with the legislature since each of the elected exec-
utive officials has a vested interest separate from that of the 
governor, The fortunes of politics occasionally enable;a,governor 
to assume a legislative leadership role, but this has been rather 
infrequent. 
Governor Raymond Gary was the last Oklahoma governor who was able 
to exercise effective legislative leadership. Much of Governor Gary's 
success resulted from his close association with the prevailing politi-
cal forces of the legislature. He had served as a senate leader during 
the legislative session immediately prior to .. his election as governor 
in November of 1954. It was basically the same clique with which Gary 
had identified while serving in the Senate that remained in control of 
the legislature throughout the years of his administration. 
Governors J, Howard Edmondson and Henry Bellman, the immediate 
successors to Governor Gary, respectively, have not enjoyed the same 
degree of leadership success vis-a-vis the state legislature. 
Governor Edmondson was identified as a political "trouble-maker" or 
"crew-cut" in that he sought to make changes which would have drasti-
11 1 d h f Okl h 1 . . 30 ca ya tere t e power structure o a oma po 1t1cs. Many of the 
30 The Governor was successful in establishing a merit system for 
state governmental employees and a central purchasing law. However, 
it was his attempts to establish a constitutional highway commission 
and place county commissioners under the state highway department 
which generated such intens.ive legislative hostility. 
Governor's proposals were ignored, altered or defeated by the power of 
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a legislature which was controlled by the "Old Guard"o 
Likewise, Governor Bellman, serving as the §tate.'s first 
Republican governor with a heavily Democratic legislature, has not 
been able to exercise effective influence over the legislature as 
indicated by the fate of his proposals concerning the state 1 s in-
28 
32 dustrial development agencyo Although the membership of the Oklahoma 
legislature has changed rather extensively since the federal courts 
ordered reapportionment, this change has yet to have much impact upon 
the control of the legislature" Representative Jo D. McCarty remains 
in control of the powerful office of Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentativeso This background of executive-legislative relationship 
has to be kept in mind as we pursue the development of the Oklahoma 
industrial development agency. In comparison with many other states, 
Oklahoma is not only confronted with a low level of industrial de-
velopment, but also suffers from a weak executive branch which has 
been unable to pursue an aggressive industrial expansion program. 
31Rural control of the Oklahoma legislature, which is extensively 
described in Chapter III, prevailed throughout the Edmondson adminis-
tration. In fact,much of the legislative hostility toward Governor 
Edmondson can be attributed directly to his efforts to bring about 
legislative reapportionment on a population basis. This was not 
accomplished until the federal courts so ordered in 1964. Governor 
Edmondson left office in January of 19630 
"Old Guard" as used in this thesis has reference to that portion 
of the legislature which is basically conservative in nature. Often 
times the "Old Guard" and rural element will be used synomously, 
32In a personal interview in Oklahoma City April 21, 1966, 
Governor Bellman said: "I sent a message to the legislature re-
questing the establishment of two new departments, a department of 
planning and development and a department of parks and lodges; how-
ever, the legislature completely ignored my proposals," 
29 
As has been discussed throughout this chapter, industrial 
development agencies have often become entangled with political pro-
blems. Many of these problems have stemmed primarily from two 
sources--political involvement due to the general legislative-executive 
relationships and political involvement stemming from the state agency'' s 
approach toward industrial development,· These problems are illustrated 
through a comparison of states surrounding Oklahoma with the model 
agency and its approach toward industrialization. It is hoped that 
some meaningful reference point can be established for analyzing the 
Oklahoma Industrial Development and Park Department which will lead to 
the source of its ineffectiveness. 
Why has industrial development not flourished in Oklahoma as it 
has in some of its neighboring states? Is it due to the executive-
legislative relationship, the involvement of politics in the approach 
of the agency, or some combination of the two? 
In most of the states surrounding Oklahoma, the industrial 
development function is performed by an executive department created 
solely for that purpose .33 Arkansas, . for instance, raised the 
Arkansas Industrial Development Commission to the level of a separate 
department in 1955. . "Prior to 1955, industrial development was the 
responsibility of the Resources and Development Commission which 
34 
also was responsible for recreation and geological work. 11 Of those 
33The comparison is based upon personal correspondence with 
industrial development agencies in the states of Arkansas, Colorado, 
Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico and Tex{:l.s. The State of Kansas did 
not answer the letter of inquiry. 
34Personal correspondence with Windell R. Adams, Research 
Consultant for the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, June 14, 
19660 
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states consulted, New Mexico is the only state which incorporates 
industrial development with other functions. The New Mexico De-
partment of Development is responsible for publication, .tourism and 
industrial development. Such a practice is considered undesirable 
since the additional functions may increase the chance for the in-
vovlement of politics. This is especially true when tourism is 
included as a function of the department. Tourism often involves 
the agency in, such matters as state parks which are particularly 
vulnerable to political considerations, 
Likewise, New Mexico is the only exception to the generalization 
that directors of the various state industrial development agencies are 
appointed by boards or commissions which are in turn appointed by the 
governors. In New Mexico the director is appointed directly by the 
35 
Governor. Such a practice increases the possibility of the ap-
pointment being labeled as "political". Thus, it is thought that 
appointment of the director by an advisory board or commission will 
serve to de-politicize the development agency, 
Another provision set forth by the model agency for removing 
industrial development agencies from the struggles of partisan 
politics is the establishment of what is known as staggered-terms for 
the supervisory boards or commissions which do the hiring of directors, 
In Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas members are appointed for terms of 
six years with one-third of the positions expiring each two years. 
Consequently, in both Arkansas and Texas, where the governor's term is 
35 Personal correspondence with Milt Andrus, Chief of the Industrial 
Division of the New Mexico Department of Development, June 22, 1966, 
only for a period of two years, a governor would have to be elected 
twice before he could appoint a majority of the commission members. 
As is recommended by the guidelines of the "ideal" agency, 
Colorado has a statutorily established bi-partisan requirement. The 
Colorado Industrial Commission is composed of three commissioners 
appointed for staggered terms of six years, i.e., a new member is 
appointed every two years. "The [Colorad9../ law provides that not 
36 
more than two members can be of one political party . ." 
Likewise, Missouri makes use of the bi-partisan commission 
requirement. However, it does not employ the staggered expiration of 
terms technique. The Missouri Commerce and Industrial Development 
Commission consists of six members. "In compliance with the law 
31 
creating the bi-partisan Commission, three are Democrats and three are 
Republicans. 1137 
In none of the states consulted is there any mention of a 
residence requirement as a prerequisite to serving as director of 
the state development agencies. 38 In fact, Louisiana's Act Number 
403, sub-section 933, specifically states that "the executive director 
may be selected within or without the State of Louisiana ..... 11 Arkansas 
36 Personal correspondence with Richard E. Moss, Executive 
Secretary, Industrial Commission of Colorado, June 14, 1966. 
3 ?Missouri, ·Ninth Biennial Report, Division of Commerce and 
Industrial Development, July l, 1962 to June 30, 1964." 
38In the cases of New Mexico, Missouri and Colorado there was 
no opportunity to examine the legislation establishing the various 
agencies; however, there was no mention of such a requirement in the 
correspondence with these states 1 officials. 
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and Texas laws make no mention of residence as a requirement for their 
development agencies. 
Araknsas, Louisiana., Texas and Colorado all require senate 
confirmation of the governor's appointees .for the various governing 
.boards or commissions. Such a requirement is considered desirable. 
Although the legislature has ultimate control of the agency through 
its power to control appropriations, it is thought that legislative 
. involvement in the appointment process might c.ause less frustration 
than a refusal to appropriate funds. Once the legislature has approved 
the appointment of commissioners, it probably will appropriate funds. 
There was no opportunity to explore the operational techniques 
employed by each of the agencies which were structurally analyzed. 
However, the basic operation of the Texas Industrial Development 
Commission provides an excellent reference point. The Texas agency 
follows rather closely the techniques recommended as most ideal. The 
Commissions' executive director explained the approach taken by the 
Texas agency as follows: 11 ••• we have tried to operate this organi-
zation on the 'complementing and coordinating·' concept rather than the 
39 
'ball-carrying:' concept .II The Commission now 11 leaves it to local 
industrial development people to explain the advantages of their 
40 locations to the prospect." 
39Personal coDrespondence with ·the Executive Director .of the 
Texas Industrial Commission, .Harry W. Clark, May 1.7, 1966, 
40 
Personal correspondence with Alvin A .. Burg:er_, Exe.cutive Director-, 
Texas Research League, Austin, Texas, July 1,. 19.66, 
CHAPTER III 
RISE AND FALL OF THE OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
All states have established governmental agencies to promote 
industrial development within their respective borders. Oklahoma 
established its first full-time development agency, the Department 
of Commerce and Industry, in February of 1955. 
Since it is the primary purpose of this study to reveal the 
nature and the effect of "political interference" on the State's 
industrial development effort, it becomes necessary to probe the 
political background of the Department of Commerce and Industry. 
Thus, it is the purpose of this chapter to focus attention upon the 
political aspects of the following questions: What type of develop-
ment agency existed prior to the establishment of the Department of 
Corrnnerce and Industry? Why was the Department established? In 
other words, what was the political significance of the Department's 
establishment? What type of agency was established? What was its 
legal relationship to the legislative and executive branches? How 
did the Department's method of operation relate to the political 
forces of the state? To what extent was the Department able to 
avoid partisan political entanglement and thus successfully accomplish 
its primary task? What was the relationship between the Department's 
degree of success and its structural organization? 
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Previous State Governmental Assistance 
Immediately prior to the creation of the Department of Commerce 
and Industry, gove,rnmental assistance to industrial development in 
Oklahoma was performed by a branch of the Oklahoma Planning and Re-
sources Board known as the Division of State and Industrial Planning. 
This Division actually came into existence in 1951, and was commonly 
known as the Division of State Planning. 1 The parent agency, the 
Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board, had a membership of 11 with 
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the governor appointing seven of the members. The seven initial 
appointees served terms of varying lengths so that only one vacancy 
was created each year. Subsequent appointments were to be for seven 
year terms. The Governor, the Director of the Department of Highways, 
the Director .of the Game and Fis.h Commission and the President of 
the State Board of agriculture served as ·ex-offic·io members of the 
Board. 2 The Chairman of the Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board 
was also. the Director of the Division of State and Indus.trial 
Planning.3 Thus, until the creation of the Department of Commerce 
and Industry, the only gov.ernmental agency organized for the purpose 
of encouraging industrial development in Oklahoma was a subsidiary 
branch of a department which was also concerned with the management 
of state parks and recreational facilities. The ·.record of the 
operation of the Board indicates that the management of state parks 
· and other state recreational facilities was its primary interest. 
loklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes 1951, Title 74, sec. 351e. 
2Ibid., Title 74 1 sec. 344.9. 
3Ibid., Title 74, sec •. 344.10. 
The function of the Oklahoma Planning and Resourceq Board was 
made conspicuous by the nature of its ex-officio membership. They 
were people who would ordinarily be expected to be concerned with 
matters other than industrial development, per se. This assumption 
is supported by the thought conveyed in personal interviews with 
certain members of the Oklahoma legislature. They indicated that 
industrial development was a secondary function of the Oklahoma 
Planning and Resources Board. However, a somewhat different picture 
is reflected by the statutes creating the Division of State and 
Industrial Planning. In fact, the industrial development function 
of the Planning and Resources Board, as ascertained from {I. review of 
the pertinent statutes, appears to be quite comprehensive in nature. 
It was to collect and assemble various types of information necessary 
to the promotion of industrial expansion such as statistics on raw 
materials available, power and water resources, transportation 
facilities, availability of labor, availability of markets, availa-
bility of banking and financial facilities, and availability of 
industrial sites, plus the additional function of acquainting the 
people of Oklahoma with industrial opportunities and encouraging new 
industrial concerns to locate in Oklahoma. 4 However, at least two 
factors lead to the conclusion that the Board was not successful 
in its efforts to achieve its statutorily stated goals. First, the 
Division of State and Industrial Planning never did collect and 
assemble adequate information on matters such as cost of production, 
4Ibid., Title 74, sec. 344.11. 
transportation costs, and the type and availability of labor. 5 
Secondly, members of the Oklahoma legislature justified the creation 
of the Department of Commerce and Industry as a replacement for the 
Division of State and Industrial Planning on the basis that the Di-
vision lacked accomplishment. 6 In fact, the objectives of the 
Department of Commerce and Industry, as stated in Oklahoma Statutes 
1961 7 are almost identical in scope with the,objectives of the 
36 
8 Division of State and Industrial Planning which were discussed above. 
It was the thought of several legislators that more emphasis was 
needed in order to realize the achievement of these designated goals. 
Therefore, a separate department was specifically created for 
industrial development. 
Creation of a Department of Commerce and Industry 
The impetus for the creation of the Department of Commerce and 
Industry came from the gubernatorial campaign of 1954. "Raymond Gary 
ran for governor in 1954 on a platform which included adding new 
5Personal interviews with Dr. Larkin Warner, Associate Professor 
of Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwate,r, Oklahoma, Febru-
ary 23, 1966, and Dr. Richard Poole, Professor of Economics and Dean, 
College of Business, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 
March 8, 1966. 
6Personal interviews with Heber Finch, Jr., State Representative, 
Sapulpa, Oklahoma, May 27, 1966, and Lou Allard, State Re9resentative, 
Drumright, Oklahoma, April 7, 1966. 
7Although the Department of Commerce and Industry was created 
during 1955, due to the fact that the statutes are brought up to date 
each ten years, the proper citation became Oklahoma Statutes 1961. 
8oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes 1961, Title 74, sec. 673b. 
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emphasis to industrial development. Part of this was apparently the 
9 
creation of a commerce and industry department." Consequently with 
the beginning of the twenty-fifth session of the Oklahoma legislature, 
creation of such a department was labeled as "Governor Gary's number 
one bill. 1110 In fact, the Governor included a request for such legis-
lation in his initial legislative message to a joint session of the 
Twenty-fifth Oklahoma Legislature.ll 
The Governor's request for a new department received almost 
immediate legislative response. House Bill 501 passed .both houses 
of the legislature and was on the Governor's desk by February 14, 1955. 
Such extraordinary success gives the appearance of the existence of a 
strong executive branch vis-a-vis the legislature. However, the 
example of House Bill 501 portrays a picture which greatly distorts 
the normal executive-legislative relationship in Oklahoma. The legis-
lature's unusually prompt and cooperative response can only be ex-
plained within the context of the prevailing political forces at the 
time of the passage of House Bill 501. 
Representative Lou Allard of Drumright said of House Bill 501, 
"it was a very popular bill in the 1955 session. 1112 Several factors 
are important in providing an explanation for such extraordinary 
acquiescence by the Oklahoma legislature. 
9Personal interview with Dr. Richard Poole. 
lOThe Daily Oklahoman, February 8, 1955. 
11oklahoma, Journal of the Senate of the Twenty-fifth Legislature 
of the State of Oklahoma quotes the governor: "I hope that within a 
few days you will lay this bill on my desk to be signed and become a 
law of Oklahoma." 
12Personal interview with Representative Lou Allard. 
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First, Governor Gary was able to exert extraordinary influence 
over the legislature, which is within itself explainable by many 
factors rather uniquely related to his be,ing in the governor's office. 
His inauguration as the state's fifteenth governor was ·much more than 
the mere arrival of another occupant in the Mansion. January 10, 1955, 
brought to the position of chief executive a man who had been inti-
mately associated with the state's political situation for several 
years. Not only had the new governor been a member of the State Senate 
for almost 14 years, 13 he had been in the. forefront of legislative 
leadership throughout most of his years in the legislature. In fact, 
Governor Gary had served as president pro tempore of the State Senate 
as recently as the 1953 legislative session. 
The significance of the Governor's legislative experience i~ 
directly related to the political nature of that body. Governor 
Gary's success was to a great extent due to his .cl0se identification 
with the "Old Guard" or rural element of the Oklahoma legislature, As 
a member of the State Senate, Gary represented a predominately rural 
district, District Number 26 {Love and Marshall countie~/. It was 
this rural element which was very much'in control of the 1955 legis-
lative session. 14 Consequently, Governor Gary did not have to go 
13 Mr. Gary resigned from his Senate seat in September of 1954 
after receiving the Democratic Party's nomination for governor in July. 
14 Rural control of the twenty-fifth session may be evidenced by 
the following: Senator Ray Fine, President Pro Tempore and Senator 
Don Baldwin, Majority Floor Leader:: represented districts with a 
population per senator ratio of 51,286 and 31,996 respectively, while 
in District 21 (Tulsa couhty) the ratio was one senator for 297,348 
people. 
With the exception of the Speaker, a similar situation existed 
in the House of Representatives. Representative Bill Harkey,,Speaker,, 
through the process of establishing an effective relationship with 
the legislature; he was a member of the "in group". In fact, the 
Governor had an extraordinary amount of influence over the leadership 
of the twenty - fifth session . This influence was particularly strong 
in the Senate as indicated by the following: 
Both {Ray] Fine and Don Baldwin, Anadarko, the, other 
candidate for president pro tempore, supported Gary 
from the start of the governor's race . ... Fine as 
President Pro Tempore will be leader of the senate 
and Baldwin will be the spokesman for Gary ... . 15 
Further, "Don Baldwin ... was named floor leader of the Senate and 
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George Miskovsky, Oklahoma City, was elected assistant floor leader . 
Gary had previously recommended Baldwin and Miskovsky for the posts. 1116 
Governor Gary's influence over the legislative leadership was 
likewise extended to the House of Representatives . 
The House followed the recommendations of Gary and named 
James Bullard, Duncan, floor leader; Floyd Sumrall, Beaver, 
speaker pro tempore, and four assistant floor leaders, 
represented Oklahoma county whi.ch had a representative to people ratio 
of 1 : 54,436. No other House officer had a higher ratio than 1 : 17,981. 
The situation was as follows: Speaker Pro Tempore, Floyd Sumrall, 
Beaver county, 1:7,182; Majority Floor Leader, James M. Bullard, 
Stephens county, 1:17,981; Assistant Floor Leaders, Lou Allard, Creek 
county, 1:13,928; Jim Cook, Latimer county, 1 : 8,529; Jay~- Payne, 
Marshall county, 1 :7,707 and Hugh M. Sandlin, Hughes county, 1:17,896. 
I t is readily apparent that rural representation dominated the House 
leadership. Further evidence of rural domination of the Oklahoma 
legislature can be ascertained by these statistics : In the House of 
Representatives 26.2% of the people elected 61 members while 73.8% 
of the people elected 60 members. Whereas , in the Senate 22 .9% of 
the people elected 22 senators while 77.1% of the people elected 
22 senators. (Statistics are based upon an average of the 1950 and 
1960 census figures as found in Legislative Apportionment in Oklahoma, 
Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, Norman, 1951 
and 1961.) 
15The Daily Oklahoman, November 7, 1954. 
16Ibid., August 4, 1954. 
Hugh Sandlin, Holde~ville; Jay Payne, Kingston; Jim Cook, 
Wilburton, and {Lo~/ Allard.17 
Thus, the 1955 sess.ion of the Oklahoma legislature began with an 
unusually high degree of harmony between the legislature and the 
governor's office. The Governor had succeeded in selecting the 
40 
leadership of both houses. In short, it can be said that the Governor 
enjoyed a relationship which has not since been equaled .as indicated 
by the remarks of members of the·present legislature which typically 
reflect an attitude similar to the following: "No governor has been 
18 in control of the legislature since the time of Gary." 
The Governor was not only able to have direct influence upon 
the selection of legislative leadership, he experienced similar 
success in the selection of the chairman of important legislative 
committees as indicated by the following: 
It already is indicated {tha!_/ there has been a 
tug of war over the selection of the chairman of the 
senate appropriations committee. Gary has apparently 
shown his desire for Herbert Hope, Pauls Valley, to 
serve inthe position again, although some of the 
backers of Fine for president pro tempore don't want 
Hope to have the position.19 
When the final committee selections were made, Governor Gary had once 
again been successful. Senator Hope was the chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee during the Twenty-fifth Legislature. 
Secondly, the creation of the Department of Commiarce and Industry 
was partially due to much legislative concern with the plight of 
17Ibid. 
18Personal interview with Curtis Lawson, State Representative 
from Tulsa, .Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, April 1, 1966. 
l9The Daily Oklahoman, November 7, 1954. 
industrial development in Oklahoma. This concern was especially 
prevalent among the leadership of the House of Representatives. 
Representative Lou Allard expressed a commonly shared attitude when 
he said: 
Prior to this creation.{the Department of Commerce and 
Industry/ the function of industrial development was 
carried on by a division of the Pl,!!_nning and Resources 
Board. It {industrial developmen!_/ played a role of 
se~ondar~ importancZO We thought it should be of 
primary importance. 
The uniqueness of the circumstances surrounding the creation of 
the Department of Commerce and Industry is refl~cted by Allard's 
41 
comments. Representative Allard, who was chosen by the Governor as an 
assistant floor leader, was also selected by the Gove.rnor ·to manage 
House Bill 501 in the House of Representatives. Allard labels himself 
as one of the "originators" of such legislation. 
Thirdly, the creation of the Department of Commerce and Industry 
can be partially attributed to general suppo,rt from the business 
community. Chambers of Commerce and leading individuals of the 
business community such as W. P. Bill Atkinson were among the ranks 
of the group urging the legislature to establish a department for the 
purpose of promoting industrial growth.21 Atkinson called the 
22 
establishment of the Department "one of the most forward steps" 
that Oklahoma has taken in the direction of industrial development. 
20p 1 ' · ' h R ' L Al 1 d ersona interview wit epresentative · ou ar . 
2lstate Representative Heber Finch, Jr. indicated in a pe-rsonal 
interview April 7, 1966, .that the Chambers of Commerce were always 
in favor of the establishment of such a department. 
22The Daily Oklahoman, March 14, 1954. 
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Legislative opposition to an executive initiated proposal to 
either alter or abolish a governmental agency would ordinarily be 
considered as a "normal" reaction. -For example, when Gover.nor 
Henry Bellman proposed to the Thirtieth Legislature the creation of 
two separate departments to replace the Department of Commerce and 
Industry and the Planning and Resources Board, he was completely 
. d 23 ignore . Instead of following Governor Bellmon 1 s advice, the legis-
lature reacted with the creation of the Industrial Development and 
Park Department. 
Legislators often concern themselves with the operation of 
particular executive agencies or take pride in the legislation which 
originally established the agency. However, in the case of House Bill 
501 the official legislative records indicate nothing other than legis-
lative enthusiasm and cooperation in the creation of the Department of 
Commerce and Industry, as proposed by Governor Raymond Gary. If oppo-
sition existed, it was not expressed in the form of a negative vote. 
The official record of the House of Representatives ·reveals 107 House 
members voted in the affirmative with the balance being recorded as 
"excused11 • 24 Likewise, .the Senate vote reflected a similar situation 
with 42 of the 44 members voting "Aye" while one senator was recorded 
as "excused" and another as "abstaining". 25 
23Personal interview with Henry Bellman, Governor, State of 
Oklahoma, .Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, April 21, 1966. 
24oklahoma, Journal of the House of Representatives of the Twenty-
fifth Legislature of the State of Oklahoma, p. 140. 
25oklahoma, Journal of the Senate -of the Twenty-fifth Legislature 
of the State of Oklahoma, p. 163. 
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Additional evidence of Senate support fo-r House Bill 501 is 
provided through the eagerness of senators to be personally identified 
with the Bill. According to official records, 10 senators were listed 
26 
as coauthors when the Bill was introduced in the Senate, while an 
additional 19 members requested to be listed as coauthors -in later 
Senate consideration of the measure. 27 Thus, eventually 30 members of 
the 44 member body were willing to have their names directly associated 
with what had been labeled as "Governor Gary's number one bill" of the 
twenty-fifth session of the Oklahoma legislature. 
Perhaps of greater significance than the gene-ral support which 
the Senate gave the proposal was the cosponsorship of Senator Clem 
Hamilton. Only three sessions later, in 1961, .it was Senator Hamilton 
who introduced Senate Bill 256 which was designed for the express 
purpose of abolishing _the Department of Commerce and Industry by 
placing it once again under t·he Oklahoma Planning and Resources 
28 Board. 
As has been indicated throughout the first portion of this 
chapter, the Oklahoma legislature undoubtedly was controlled by the 
rural element. Why did such an agrarian dominated legislature es-
tablish a separate department for the purpose of industrial develop-
ment? Were rural legislators expecting to reap political benefits 
from the creation of such an agency? The answer to these questions 
26Ibid. ,,.·p. 158i 
27Ibid., p. 163. 
28oklahoma, Journal of the Senate of t·he Twenty-eighth Le·gislature 
of the State of Oklahoma, p. 437. 
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stems directly from the particular individual occupying the governor's 
office. It was Raymond Gary who represented the concensus of the 
Twenty-fifth Oklahoma Legislature. The electionsi:0f:1954 had merely 
brought about a change in the title preceding Gary's name, He was now 
governor of the State of Oklahoma, whereas he had been president pro 
tempore of the State Senate from 1953 until his resignation in 1954. 
It is significant that Governor Gary, who was very closely 
identified with the rural faction of the legislature, proposed the 
creation of a department of commerce and industry. It .must be re-
membered that he .first proposed the creation of a separate department 
for commerce and industry during .the gubernatorial campaign of 1954. 
Therefore, the question which arises is: Did Raymond Gary propose 
to create a separate industrial development agency as part of his 
overall effort to broaden his political base? There is no precise 
answer to this question; however, some of the circumstances surround-
ing the Democratic Party's gubernatorial primary of 1954 lend credence 
to such an assertion, 
Certainly, adding emphasis to the need for industrial development 
should have done no harm to Gary-'s image among urban voters. As 
events developed, it was the vote of the urban counties which provided 
Gary with a large por,tion of his narrow primary victory, Gary defeated 
Oklahoma City attorney, William 0,. Coe, by the slim margin of 18,841 
votes out of a total of 484,999 votes cast in a bitterly contested 
runoff primary. Gary receiyed 14,065 of his 18,841 vote margin in the 
State's two largest counties, Oklahoma and Tulsa counties. 29 
29oliver Benson, et. al., Oklahoma Votes 1907-1962 (Norman, 1964), 
Another indication of the importance of the urban vote in the 
1954 election was reflected in the Democratic Party primary results. 
With the exception of Gary, all of the gubernatorial candidates 
placing among the top five were from Oklahoma City, Tulsa and Lawton. 
Thus by 1954, it was becoming more and more essential for a candidate 
in a state-wide election to run well in the urban counties. Raymond 
Gary's proposal of adding greater emphasis to industrial development 
may have been a recognition of this fact. 30 
Role and Operation of the Department 
For whatever may have been the reasons, a Department of Commerce 
and Industry was established as provided for in the Oklahoma Statutes 
Supplement 1955, Title 74, Chapter 23. The State Economic Development 
Act, which created the Department of Commerce and Industry, placed the 
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supervision of the Department under the Governorus Economic Development 
Commission. This Commission originally was composed of 25 members who 
were to be appointed solely by the Governor for terms of six years after 
the establishment of the Commission. The initial Commissioners, who 
were appointed in 1955, were appointed so that one third had two year 
terms, one third had four year terms, and the other third had six year 
31 
terms. However, in 1961 the legislature passed legislation which 
30The significance of Mr. Gary's request for a separate department 
for commerce and industry should not be expanded out of proportion. 
Many other factors were of equal or greater significance. It should be 
remembered that the 1954 Democratic Party gubernatorial primary was, to 
a very large degree, a personality contest between Mr. Gary and Mr. Coe. 
Very few issues of substance were discussed, In fact, Mr. Coe mentioned 
throughout his campaign speeches that he had no platform. 
31 Oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes Supplement 1955, Title 74, sec. 675. 
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reduced the number of commissioners to six. This amendatory act 
provided that the governor was to appoint these six members from among 
the original commission. These appointments were to endure only until 
February 1, 1963. After February 1, 19.63, the Governor was to appoint, 
subject to the State Senate's approval, two members for terms of two : 
years, two members for terms of four years, and two members for terms 
of six years, thereby establishing a staggered expiration of terms 
feature. Commission members were subject to removal for cause only. 32 
The Governor was authorized to appoint the Director and "employ 
such other office and technical staff and consultants ... on such terms 
and conditions as he shall consider necessary and advisable .... 1133 In 
1961 the Economic Development Act of 1955 was amended so that the 
Economic Development Commission appointed the Director. The amendment 
removed the word Governor and supplemented the words Economic De-
velopment Commission. Otherwise, Section 672b was not altered~ 34 
The Commission was created to "serve as a planning and 
co~ordinating body to the Governor and the State Department of Commerce 
35 
and Industry." The Commission was statutorily required to meet with 
the Department at least once a month. Special meetings could be called 
by the governor or the Commission chairman, who was selected from 
among the Commission members by a vote of the membership, although in 
32oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes 1961, Title 74, sec. 675. 
33oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes Supplement 1955, Title ·74, sec. 
672b. 
34 Oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes 1961, Title 74, sec. 672b. 
35Ibid., Title 74, sec. 675d. 
actual practice the governor had much influence over this ·sele-ct-ion. 
The scope of the C.ommissions.l "planning and studies shall include all 
of those specific powers, duties, and subjects assigned to the St-ate 
Department of Commerce and Industry ..•.. rr36 
In summary, the ·Commission was appointed by the governor to direct 
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the Department of Commerce and Indus-try ·in a very general sense. Actual 
operation of the Department was the responsibility of the Director. 
Although after 1961 it was the Commission which was officially responsi-
ble for the hiring and firing .of the Director, the:Governor continued 
to direct the development of the Department's policies through his 
control over the Commission. Mr. Ed Malzahn, who w13-s appointed to 
the Commission in February of 1963 and served as Chairman until the Com-
mission's abolishment in May of 1965, said that he considered his 
responsibility to be that of carrying out the policies of the 
Governor. 37 
The only relationship between the legislature and the Commission 
was the power of the Senate, after 1961, to reject the Governor's 
nominees to the Commission. The legislature had no economic leve·rage 
over the Commission since its members were not salaried. The only 
compensation which the Commissioners ·received was a statutorily 
36Ihid. 
37personal interview March 15, 1966, Perry, Oklahoma with 
Ed Malzahn who became chairman of the Governor's Economic Development 
Commission in February, 1963, At the present time Mr. Malzahn,is 
Chairman of the Industrial Developlllent and Park Commission, the 
successor agency; 
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established $15 per day while attending meetings or on official 
b . 1 · 1 f 1 3 8 us1.ness, pus ten cents per m1. e or trave expenses. 
The legislature was not too precise in spelling out what was 
expected of the Department of Commerce and Industry .. Oklahoma Statutes 
1961, Title 74, sec. 673b provides for many of the Department's general 
objectives such as: 
To study, investigate and undertake ways and means 
of promoting the prospe-rous development and protection of 
legitimate interests and welfare of Oklahoma bus.iness, of 
markets for Oklahoma products,, and the secur-ing of additional 
employment and payrolls within the state. 
Based upon both the general nature of the statutory functions and 
the statements of Oklahoma legislators, one of the most ·important 
functions of the Department of Commerce and Industry was to serve as 
the ·industrial IJromotional agency for the State. Oklahoma Statutes 
1961 include such statements as: 
To encourage, promote,and do .those things which 
are deemed to be necessary to cause the establis·hment 
of new commercial and industrial operations,, the location 
of branch plants and establishments .... 39 
Also, "The principal duties of the {Governor's Economic Developmen!_/ 
Commiss.ion will be to attract beneficial industry to the State of 
Oklahoma •..• 1140 
Individual members of the ·Oklahoma legislature have expressed 
opinions concerning what they consider to be the proper role of the 
38 Oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes 1961, Title 74, sec. 675. 
39Ibid., Title 74, sec. 673b. 
40Ibid., Title 74, sec. 675e. 
Department which are similar to Speaker McCarty's statement: "{I!:,_/ 
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should be one of selling the State." As indicated in Chapter II, 
such a role today is generally viewed as .ineffective. Also, there 
are many indications that emphasize the "attracting" or "selling" 
approach is self-defeating in that a record of low yield, in terms of 
new plants secured, places the Department in a weak position when it 
seeks new appropriations. This problem will be explored at greater 
length in this study. 
Although it is not the purpose of this study to probe the 
technical operation of the Department of Commerce and Industry, a 
brief discussion of such operation is necessary in order to under-
49 
stand the nature of the political forces which relate to the Department. 
It should be noted that the statements which are made concerning 
the actual operation of the Department are based upon the remarks of 
individuals which were made within the context of an attempt to dis-
cover the extent and nature of the Department's political involvement. 
Consequently, the discussion of the Department's operation is rather 
general in nature. 
The Department of Commerce and Industry functioned as a general 
industrial promotional and research agency. It placed great emphasis 
on the "sell Oklahoma" technique. Field representatives were sent to 
establish contact with major industrial firms in an effort to discover 
companies which were either planning or could be encouraged to expand 
41Personal interview with J. D. McCarty, Speakeri Oklahoma House 
of Representatives, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, April 19, 1966. 
.or move their plant facilities to Oklahoma. In certain instances the 
Department attempted to play a direct role in the,actual negotiations 
with firms which had indicated that they had some interest in moving 
to Oklahoma. On tl:ie other hand, the Department sometimes functioned in 
a more passive manner in that it notified several Oklahoma communities 
of potential prospects and let them do the negotiating. 
It was part of the Department's ·responsibility to gather and 
compile statistical information vital to industrial development .. Much 
of this information was use.d by the field representatives in their 
promotional work. However, ~. ,Department also provided statistical 
da.ta concerning the feasibility of certain industrial projects. In 
this capacity the Department made recommendations or helped prepare 
general reports for presentation to the Oklahoma Industrial Finance 
Authority. It is the latter agency which controls the sale of bonds 
42 
and loans for the purpose of financing new industrial plants. The 
Department of Commerce and Industry was directly related to the 
Finance Authority in that its Director served as a member of the 
Authority's Board of Directors. 43 
In an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the Department's 
operations, Mr. William Wright, Manager of the Chamber of Commerce, 
Stillwater, Oklahoma, was consulted. On the basis of Mr .. Wright's 
remarks, the Department has not been of much benefit to local groups 
50 
.seeking to attract new industry. Mr. Wright indicated that he has been 
42oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes 1961, Title 74, sec. 855 .. 860. 
43Ibid., Title 74, sec~ .854. 
concerned with industrial development for many years during which time 
he has learned what industrial firms want to know prior to making a 
decision to move to a new location. Consequently, he does not need to 
use the state agency since it only would be able to provide him with 
general guidance. 
In regard to the locating of a particular industrial firm, Moore 
Business Forms, Incorporated, which during .recent months decided to 
locate a major manufacturing plant in Stillwater, Wright indicated 
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that the.state development agency had nothing to do with the firm's 
negotiations with the Stillwater community. All necessary statistical 
information was prepared by Mr. Wright and his associates.· The 
Industrial Development and Park Department was ·notified of the company's 
interest in Stillwater only after it had been decided that they would 
come to Stillwater if the necessary financing could be provided. It 
was at this stage that the Department's assistance was soqght. Wright 
said that he had the Department's Director assist him in the pr~paration 
of a presentation to the Oklahoma Industrial Finance Authority . 
. Mr. Wright explained that he kept his contact with Moore Business 
Forms a well-guarded secret because he feared that the Department would 
pass the information to other cities throughout the state and thereby 
increase the competition. Thus, the Department was not notified until 
after most of the detailed negotiations had been completed. 
In the case of Moore Business ·Forms, .Mr. Wright related that he 
got his "lead" from personal sources. .The ·State ag.ency was of no 
assistance in this -regard. Wright did say that the Department quite 
regularly provides him with information on potential prospects. 
However, according to Wright, "many of these 'leads' are way-out 
affairs. 1144 
Altho~gh this Farticular illustration involved the Industrial 
Development and Park Department rather than the Department of Commerce 
and Industry, it was indicated that there would have been no signifi-
cant difference in the relationship between the local development 
groups and the state agency. In particular, Mr. Wright indicated that 
there has been no significant change in the relationship of the state 
development agency and local chambers of commerce. 
Thus, on the basis of this limited inquiry it appears that the 
Department was not wry_ successful in its attempt to attract new 
industry to Oklahoma. Such an assumption is supported by the comment 
by certain legislators that local groups were more effective than the 
state agency. Senator Robert Murphy said, 
there was hostility from legislators because Commerce and 
Industry tried to take credit for all industry coming into 
the State when the legislature knew that private concerns 
and chambers of commerce were responsible for a great deal 
of this.45 
Similarly, Representative Heber Finch, Jr, remarked, "The Commerce and 
Industry Department was not as effective as chambers of commerce and 
46 
other civic groups.I' On the other hand, the published report of 
the Department indicates that the Department was generally successful. 
However, it is difficult to tell just what role the Department played 
44Telephone interview with William Wright, Manager, Chamber of 
Commerce, Stillwater, Oklahoma, August 1, 1966. 
45Personal interview with State Senator Robert Murphy. 
46 Personal interview with Representative Heber Finch, Jr. 
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in bringing industry to the state or in expanding existing.industry. 
According to the published reports of the Industrial Development 
and Park Department between January 1, 1965, and January 1, 1966, 107 
new plants were brought to the state and 183 expans.ions of existing 
industries wet!e .completed. The Depa.rtment does not indicate what 
role it played in such industrial development. The Activities 
Report January 1963-January 1966 merely states: " ... the department 
has had at least a partial, or indirect effect, on practically all of 
47 
this growth." 
The Department's Legislative Relationships 
The Department of Commerce and Industry, under the leadership of 
. 48 
its first director Dr. Randall Klemme apparently began its operation 
with the blessings of the legislature. .From all indications Klemme' s 
relationship with the legislature was quite harmoneous. Several 
members of the Oklahoma legislature express highly favorable sentiment 
for Klemme, such as: "The Department {;f Commerce and Industry/ was of 
49 little value after Klemme le.ft. 11 Never have any members of the legis-
lature elaborated as to why th~y had, such: _high. regard for Klemme. 
Nevertheless, the significant fact is that the legislature was pleased 
47 Activities Report January 1963-January 1966. . This Report 
includes statistics from both the Department of Commerce and Industry 
and its successor, the Industrial Development and Park Department. 
48Klemme was the director of a Ford Foundation progect in Pakistan 
at the time of his appointment. .Previously he had served as a member 
of the faculty and as Vice President at the Oklahoma A & M College. 
49Personal interview with Representative Lou Allard. 
with Klemme's operation of the Department, which is indicated by the 
rather pro~perous position of the Department. in te.rms of 
appropriations. 50 
Dr. Kilemme served for two and one half years·of the Gary 
administration, resigning in December, 1957, to take a job ·in private 
industry. He was succeeded by an Oklahoma S.tate University Professo.r 
Emeritus of Economics, Dr. Raymond Thomas. Apparently, the Thomas 
administration was nothing more than an "interim term" since ·there is 
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no indication that anything of significance happened during this period 
of time. 
With the election of J, .Howard Edmondson as Governor in 195:8, the 
Department of Commerce and Industry passed into a new era. Governor 
Edmondson's ·nominee for the Director's post was Max Genet. Mr. Genet 
remained in this position throughout the next four years although the 
latter part of his administration was marked by iritens.ive legislative 
hostility aimed directly at his operation of the Department. 
It was during .the last two years of the Edmondson administration 
that the state legislature began to attempt -to alter the administration 
of the Department of Commerce and Industry which eventually led to the 
merger of the Department with the Planning and Resources Board in 1965. 
The first effort to abolish the Department came in 1961 when Senator 
Clem Hamilton introduced Senate Bill 256. This Bill proposed to place 
the Department under the Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board. 
50state of Oklahoma, Budg.et, for the fiscal years ending June 30, 
1956-57 and June 30, 1958-59 reveals appropriations of $450,000 and 
$610,000 respectively. 
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Hamilton's proposal was sent to the·Committee on State and Federal 
Government where it died due to the failure of the Committee to report 
it. 
Again in 1963 the legislature began to discuss altering the 
Department of Commerce and Industry. This action resulted after it 
was learned in the latter part of 1962 that Genet had become extremely 
irresponsible in his handling of Departmental funds. Legislative 
hearings in early 1963 resulted in Genet being charged with three counts 
of grand larceny. The Genet investigations once again led to dis-
cussion which had as its goal severe alteration of the Department. Only 
a few weeks later, the Department was once again a legislative target; 
however, this time it was not Genet who was the cause for concern. 
Rather it was Governor Bellmon's appointment of Lloyd Allen which 
stimulated the discussion. Legislative opposition temporarily subsided 
until 1965 when legislation was once again proposed to merge the 
Department with the Planning and Resources Board. The major difference 
in this proposal was the result. On June 30, 1965, Senate Bill 32 7 was 
sent to the governor's office for approval. 
Development of the Industrial Development 
and Park Department 
The legislature during its 1965 session, replaced the Department 
of Commerce and Industry with a department which also assumed responsi-
bility for the promotion of tourism and park management. This legis-
lation known as the Oklahoma Resources Development Act of 1965 placed 
general supervision of the industrial development agency under the 
Industrial Development and Park Commission. This Commission consists 
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of seven members, one from each of the State's six Congressional 
Districts and one member to be appointed at large. Commissioners are 
appointed for terms of six years by the governor with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. The initial appointments are made in a manner 
so that one member's term expires each year with the exception that 
two terms expire during certain years because there are seven members 
. . 51 
serving six-year terms. 
Section V of the Act states that, "the Oklahoma Industrial 
Development and Park Commission shall be the policy-determining 
agency for the Oklahoma Industrial Development and Park Department and 
shall determine the broad plans and programs for the accomplishments 
of duties and responsibilities vested by law in the, said commission. 1152 
The responsibilities of the Commission included the appointment of 
the director who serves at the pleasure of the Commission. The director 
is the Department's chief administrative offi.ce:r and is responsible for 
carrying out the policies of the Commission. In order to accomplish 
this task the director is given the authority to appoint five division 
heads. The divisions provided by the Act are as follows: "(a) In-
dustrial, Business and Economic Development (b) Lodges (c) Parks, 
recreation and Waterways (d) Publicity, Advertising and Information, 
and (3) Research and Planning. 1153 
There are certain portions of the Act which are of such 
significance that they should be given particular attention. First, 
51oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes Supplement 1965, Title 74, sec. 1104. 
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Ibid., Title 74, sec. 1105. 
53Ibid., Title 74, sec. 1109 0 
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Section VII provides that "no person shall be appointed Director who has 
n~ been a resident and a qualified elector in this State for a period 
f 1 h d . h. . 11 54 o at east tree years prece ing is appointment. Suchta provision 
is unusual and undesirable since it may prohibit the hiring of the most 
qualified person to perform a technical function which is not directly 
related to state boundaries. 
Secondly, Section XV authorizes the Director to appoint an 
associate director, 
who shall be recommended by the Executive Committee of the 
State Legislative Council, provided, however, if the Legis-
lature is in.session when said position is. vacant; a six-member 
committee comprised of three members of the Senate, to be 
appointed by the President Pro Tempore, and three members of 
the House of Representatives; to be appointed by the Speaker, 
shall recommend said appointment.55 
This provision was such a blatant legislative interference into 
the operation of this executive department that the State's Attorney 
General "ruled" it to be unconstitutional. According to the Attorney 
General's opinion, Section XV of the Act violates that portion of the 
Constitution which says that "the Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither 
56 
shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.','_ 
Obviously, legislative appointment of the Associate Director failed to 
meet this requirement, 
Apparently the legislature agreed with the Attorney General's 
interpretation since it failed to attempt to 1:make the recommendation. 
54 
Ibid., Title 74, sec .. 1107. 
55Ibid., Title 74, sec. 1115. 
56oklahoma:., Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, Article IV, 
sec. 1. 
On December 29, 1965, Ed Matthews was named by the Commission to the 
associate director's post. 
On the basis of the interviews conducted during the course of 
this study, it appears that the function of the Industrial Development 
and Park Department is essentially the same as the Department of Com-
merce and Industry. The Department continues to emphasize the pro-
motional."sell Oklahoma" approach. Direct contact of leading 
industrialists is still considered essential to the success of the 
Department's operation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT IN OKLAHOMA 
When a new executive agency, such as an industrial development 
agency, is formed, its precise scope, structure and function is 
determined by the legislation which established the agency. Oklahoma 
has a very weak executive branch. Consequently, the development of an 
executive agency in Oklahoma will, to a very large degree, be de-
termined by the dominate political forces of the State leg.islature, 
It is the purpose of this chapter to explore the general natuie and 
extent of these political forces in relation to the establishment of 
an industrial development agency in Oklahoma. A specific question is: 
What political forces brought about the merger of the S.tate' s original 
development agency with the Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board? 
In order to discover the nature of the political forces which have 
had an impact upon the establishment of a state industrial development 
agency, we must explore the following factors: First; the po.litical 
relationship between the Department of Commerce a.nd Industry and the 
legislature. Secondly, the nature and extent of legislative control 
over the State's industrial development agency. Thirdly, the extent 
to which the political interests of dominant political factions.in the 
legislature have been served in the legislature's interference with 
the agency. 
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The Political Background of the Department 
There was little surprise or alarm within the Oklahoma legislature 
when Senator Ralph Rhoades and cosponsoring legislators .introduced 
the proposal to merge the Department of Commerce and Industry with the 
Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board. This proposition merely marked 
the cultimation of prolonged legislative opposition to the operation 
of the Department. It had become almost common knowledge among 
legislators that before the adjournment of the thirtieth session of 
the Oklahoma legislature action would be taken to drastically alter 
this beleagured agency. 
Before the merger of these two executive agencies can be 
meaningfully analyzed, .it is necessary to have a basic understanding 
of the political forces at work. Much of the political significance 
of the merger is directly related to the individual personalities 
involved. 
As was pointed out in Chapter III, the creation of the Department 
of Commerce and Industry must be primarily attributed to the wishes of 
former Governor Raymond Gary and to a somewhat lesser degree to a 
desire on the part of the legislature and the general business com-
munity to place greater emphasis on industrial development in Oklahoma. 
It is the years of the Gary administration which provide the exception 
to the general relationship between the legislature and the Department 
from the time of .its creation in 1955 until the time of its thorough 
alteration in 1965. Throughout the Gary administration, no difficulty 
of significance developed between the Department and the legislature--
a legislature which expe.rienced a rapport with the Governor's office 
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that has since to be equaled, Apparently, the legislature was quite 
willing to leave its "hands" off the Department due to an "under-
standing" that the Department "belonged" to Governor Gary. 
From the time of its creation, the Department of Commerce and 
Industry was involved in "politics". Mr. Robert Wolf, who was employed 
in the information.and research division of the Department remarked, 
"initially, with the exception of {Randal.!_I Klemme, it was all 
politics. Most of the people {in the Departmen.!:_/ were Gary campaign 
workers." Wolf added, "I talked to Governor Gary before I .went to 
1 
work; politics were partially involved." 
Mr. Wolf's elucidation is particularly significant; he is the 
son of Cleveland County's State Representative, Leland Wolf, who was 
first elected to the Oklahoma House of Representatives in 1952. The 
significance of this relationship was set forth through the·remarks of 
one of Representative Wolf 1 s colleagues, State Representative Heber 
Finch, Jr. of Sapulpa. Duri1;1,g the course of a personal interview, 
Representative Finch identified Robert Wolf, who had since resigned 
his post with the Department, as an.important source for an explanation 
of the actual operation of the Department of Commerce and Industry. 
Finch explained that Wolf, for various reasons, was not liked by some 
of his superiors within the Department; "however," Finch added, "they 
.could not afford to fire him because of Leland's influence in the 
legislature. 112 
1Personal interview with Robert Wolf, former staff member of the 
Commerce and Industry Department, Purcell, Oklahoma, April 26, 1966. 
2Personal interview with State Representative Heber Finch, Jr. 
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Additional evidence of the Departmentus involvement in politics 
at the time of its creation is revealed through the comments of 
Representative Finch in reply to a series of questions concerning some 
of the problems of the original agency. Finch remarked, "the De-
partment was a political football from the outset." Later. within 
the context of the same interviewj Finch again emphasized the political 
nature of the Department by adding, "it had always been a political 
parking ground. 113 
Thus, from the time of its establishment the Department of 
Commerce and Industry was entangled in "partisan politics!'. This 
political involvement did not result in any noticeable hardships vis-
a-vis the legislature throughout the administration of Governor 
Raymond Gary. As long as the Department's personnel reflected a 
realistic recognition of the dominate political forces of the moment, 
its relationship with the legislature was quite smooth. As pointed 
out in Chapter III, the executive-legislative relationship during the 
Gary administration was exceptionally harmonious. Consequently, 
Governor Gary's "political" appointees were usually agreeable to the 
legislature. It was the evolution of a new executive-legislative 
relationship that resulted with the election of Governor J. Howard 
Edmondson which marked the beginning of the deteriation of the 
legislature's positive attitude toward the Department. 
According to Robert Wolf, Governor Edmondson "put in a very few 
political cronies," Wolf continued, "Edmondson's political appointees 
3Ibid. 
were primarily summertime helpers. 114 However, there is one important 
exception which eventually proved to be one of the principal reasons 
for the demise of the Department. This exception was Governor 
Edmondson's selection of Max Genet as his director of the Department. 
Without elaborating any further, Mr. Wolf stated, "Max {Gene!:_/ was 
[a.] political {-;;,ppointe~]. He was a friend of some of Edmondson' s 
big contributors. 115 Once again the Department of Commerce and 
Industry had been used as a refuge for "necessary" political payoffs. 
The remarks of several members of the Oklahoma legislature 
indicate that it was the appointment of Max Genet which drastically 
altered the relationship of the Department of Commerce and Industry 
with the legislature. In fact, the adverse impact of Mr. Genet is 
essential to an understanding of the eventual fate of the Department. 
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The Department was in trouble with the legislature soon after the 
beginning of the Genet administration as indicated by the following 
remarks of State Representative Heber Finch, Jr.: 
With_the coming of Genet the legisla!:_ure got drawn in on 
it {the "politics" of the Departmen!:_/. They {legislator~ 
became very hostile due to the fact that money was being 
spent go provide parties, girls, etc., for the Governor and 
Genet. 
A similar attitude toward Genet's operation of the Department is 
reflected in Senator Robert Murphy's explanation of the legislature's 
intensive hostility toward the Department: "There was a great deal 
4Personal interview with Robert Wolf. 
6Personal interview with Representative Heber Finch, Jr. 
of resentment over the misuse .. ·· of money by the Conunerce and Industry 
Department during the years of the Genet administration . ." 7 
Both Representative Finch and Senator Murphy are referring to 
hostilities which resulted from the legislative hearings of early 
1963 at which time the nature of Genet's mishandling of Departmental 
funds was revealed. A special Senate investigat-ing conunittee re-
vealed information which showed that Genet had charged to the De-
partment of Conunerce and Industry $24,000 for consultant services 
rendered by Dan Savage, Tulsa liquor dealer. Savage later testified 
that he had only received between $1,300 and $1,800 for his work with 
the Department. He told the investigating conunittee that he had 
authorized Genet to use the remainder of the warrants tC> "entertain 
8 indus.trial prospects. 11 
The legislative investigations ultimately led to the trying of 
Genet on three counts of grand larceny in February, 1964. Specifi-
64 
cally, Genet was charged with depositing $650 of departmental funds to 
his personal bank account. At his trial it was admitted that he had 
in fact made such a deposit; although, according to Genet, the deposit 
was made because the Department "owed" him the money since~ had used 
his ·personal money for departmental expenses. 9 
?Personal interview with Robert ·Murph~ State ·senator, S.tillwater, 
Oklahoma, March 26, 1966. 
8The Daily Oklahoman, January 31, 1963. 
9Information is .based on articles appearing in The Daily 
Oklahoman on January 31, 1963, February 5, 1963, and February 19, 
1963. 
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The Senate investigations of Genet also revealed evidence which 
caused many legislators .to believe, whether justifiable or not, that 
the Director had been involved in an "illicit" romance at the expense 
of the State. It was learned through testimony of the legislative 
auditor that the Department was charged $5,286 for telephone calls to 
a California residential telephone number during .1961, .which was more 
than the total amount spent on telephone calls to.all other states 
combined.lo The auditor further testified that "in June or July, 1961, 
telephone calls totaling $473 were made from California to Hawaii 
11 
and charged to the Department." 
Genet's trial ended with the court being µnable to reach a 
verdict. The legislature, however, was not quite as judicious w:·ith 
Genet. Whether he was guilty of the charges brought against him is 
of little significance in regard to the legislature's attitude toward 
the Department of:Commerce and Industry. The significant fact is that 
the legislature thought that State funds had been used for the 
personal benefit of Genet and Governor Edmondson, as indicated by the 
statements of Representative Finch and S.enator Murphy. 
Legislative hostility became so intense that an effort was made 
to abolish the Department. This action was ·primarily because of 
personal disgust with Genet, as is indicated by the following connnent 
of former State Senator Fred Harris, who in early 1963 was appointed 
chairman of a special Senate connnittee to study the future of the 
Department: "There was cons·iderable agitation to do away with the 
10 · The Daily Oklahoman, January 31, .1963. 
11Ibid., February 5, 1963. 
Department altogether, much of which was generated by criticisms of 
11 "12 Mr. Genet, persona y .... 
Legislative hostility toward the Department of Commerce and 
Industry was partially over the close identification of Mr. Genet 
with Governor Edmondson, who by the end of his first two years in 
office had become alienated from the legislature. A news story 
describing the Senate hearing of the Genet case identified him as, 
13 
"a close friend and protege of former Governor Edmondson." 
Whether justifiable or not, the legislature felt that Governor 
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Edmondson was using the Department of Commerce and Industry for person-
al "political" purposes, On several occasions during the course of 
interviews with members of the Oklahoma legislature, remarks were 
made similar to the following: "It {the Department of Commerce and 
Industr:y_/ became a political parking ground for the governor, especial-
ly Edmondson. Edmondson never really cared what he appointed. 1114 
As indicated by the Genet episode, the attitude of the legislature 
toward the particular individual heading any executive department is 
always of major significance in terms of the department's relationship 
with the legislature and consequently with its ultimate success or 
failure. This is especially true .when the chief executive is "weak" 
either because of his lack of ability or because of the inadequacy of 
political power at his command. The inadequacy of political power 
12Personal correspondence with Fred R. Harris, United States 
Senator from Oklahoma, March 8, 1966. 
13The Oklahoma City Times, February 18, 1964. 
14Personal interview with Representative Lou Allard. 
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available to the Governor became evident with the appointment of 
Genet's successor, Lloyd K. Allen, a Republican from Maine. Mr. Allen 
was appointed by a Republican governor, Henry Bellman, who was politi-
cally handicapped because of the existence of a predominately 
D . 1 . 1 15 eomcratic eg1s ature. 
Apparently, there was no direct political relationship between 
Governor Bellman and Lloyd Allen prior to ,Allen's appointment as 
Director of the Department of Commerce and Industry. Allen was of-
ficially hired by the Economic Development Commission following the 
recommendation of the Association of State Planning and Development 
Agencies. Mr. Ed Malzahn, the,Commission's chairman related that 
the C.ommission contacted the Association which had Mr. Allen at the 
top of their list of men available for such a position. 16 However, 
the significant fact is not whether "politics" was involved in the 
appointment; rather, it is whether state legislators believed that 
the appointment was political. 
Legislative Pomination of the Department 
The Hiring of a Director 
Lloyd Allen's encounter with the Oklahoma legislature provides a 
clear-cut example of the extent and nature of legislative control over 
15According to the Directory and Manual of the State of Oklahoma, 
1963, the Democratic-Republican ratio was 92 to 15 in the House of 
Representatives and 38 to 6 in the Senate. 
16personal interview with Ed Malzahn. 
executive agencies. Also, from the Allen case it is possible to 
ascertain some of the legislature's expectations of the directors of 
executive agencies.i,n Oklahoma. 
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Governor Bellman's decision to support the Commission's .selection 
of Lloyd Allen as Director of the Department of Commerce and Industry 
set off an intensive wave of legislative hostility. The legislature's 
criticism had nothing to do with the new Director's professional 
qualifications. Mr. Allen had come to Oklahoma with an impress,ive 
professional record. As m,eptioned above, he was highly recommended 
by a national association of economic development experts.. . Immediately 
prior to his appointment in Oklahoma, Allen had served as commissioner 
of the Department of Economic Development for the State of Maine., which 
he describes as involving "a very similar operation1117 to that of the 
Oklahoma Department of Commerce and Industry. 
The attitude of the Oklahoma legislature toward the hiring of 
Lloyd Allen is reflected through the nature of the questions asked by 
an informal group of House members before whom Mr. Allen voluntarily 
appeared. For example, Representative Merle Lansden of Beaver asked 
Allen if he knew anything about the oil depletion allowance . 18 Further, 
Mr. Allen related through personal correspondence, "I have always felt 
that the questions posed to me at the time of my first meeting with a 
group from the state legislature were posed primarily as a harrassment 
17Personal correspondence with Lloyd K. Allen, February 25, 1966. 
18The Daily Oklahoman, June 6, 1963. 
rather than an attempt to determine my competency, because they had 
very little to do with the background of Industrial Development. 1119 
It is the remarks of leg~slators in regard to the hiring of 
Mr. Allen which illustrate extens,ive legisla:tive influence over the 
Department of Commerce and Industry. A review of these remarks ,is 
essential to an understanding of the reasons for the eventual merging 
of the House of Representatives in regard to their expected role in 
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the hiring of Mr. Allen. Although the House of Representatives has no 
legal responsibility.in the hiring of members of the executive branch, 
it was Governor Bellmon' s failure to "fulfill ·his promis.e to let a 
- - 20 House committee interview the man {Alle'EJ before he was hired" which 
provided the basis for their attack upon the appointment • .In fact, 
the House went so far as to vote 67 to 17 in opposition to the 
appointment of Allen.21 The Daily Oklahoman reported on June 6, 1963, 
that "a move to dissolve the commerce and.industry department into 
the planning and resources board was •.. underway if the appointment 
{-;f AlleE:_/ was not rescinded. 11 
·The following remarks by members of the House of Representatives 
leaves no doubt that House members expected to play a major .role in 
the s.election of a director for tl:ie :Department of Commerce and Industry: 
Representative Merle Lansden complained that Allen was hired by 
Tom Harris,,who was at the time of Allen's appointment a member of the 
l9Personal correspondence with Lloyd K. Allen. 
20The Daily Oklahoman, June 11, .1963. 
21 rbid. 
Governor's Economic Development Commission. Lansden described Harris 
as a "typical, middle-aged, ivy league undergraduate, 1122 Apparently 
Representative Lansden was greatly disturbed and angered over t-he 
fact that the Commission, which was legally charged with the 
responsibility for hiring the Department's director, had done the 
hiring instead of the legislature. Likewise, Representative -Bill 
Shibley, who was the chairman of the House Indus_trial Development 
Committee during the 1963 session of the Oklahoma legislature, _in 
registering his opposition to the appointment of Allen "told newsmen 
that he will vote to'.,cut the commerce and industry budget unless 
Oklahomans get the inside track on the, director's job. 1123 
Obviously, the leglslature expected to play a direct role in the 
selection of the Department's director. In fact, certain members of 
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the legislature indicated who they wanted for the job. Several legis-
lators, Republicans and Democrats alike, indicated that they wanted 
Happy Camp, a former Republican leg_is.lator, 
This is an obvious illustration of the nature of legislative 
domination of the Department. The legislature was aware of the fact 
that the Republican Governor would have to select a Republican, Con-
sequent ly, the Democratic legislature became primarily concerned with 
getting a Republican director whom they cons.idered "acceptable" to 
their interests, as indicated by the following comments: 
The legislature knew that Happy Camp wanted th~ job and 
they wanted him to have it, He was never looked at as a 
22Ihid. 
23The Oklahoma City Times, June 6, 1963. 
Republican; he was one of the "group", He was one 
of the few who could have gotten along with the 
legislature.24 
Senator Murphy of Stillwater expressed the same idea: "Many Re-
publicans had wanted {Happy_/ Camp at the time Allen was appointed. 
Many of them resented Bellman bringing someone in .. 1125 
71 
If further evidence is needed to illustrate the preponderance of 
legislative influence in the selection of the new director of the 
Department of Commerce and Industry, the comments of Speaker J. D. 
McCarty provide the capstone. .In a remark to the press-, McCarty said 
that should the Governor insist on sticking with the appointment of 
- 26 Allen "he {Allegj will be 'urider constant harassment 1 • 11 Previously, 
the Speaker had quipped, ''the appointment of new industry is so im-
portant that I'd be willing to give the department one more last 
chance, even under Allen. 1127 ·These statements distinctly indicate 
that the continued existence of the Department was a matter to be 
decided solely by the legislature• if not by the Speaker himself. 
The Legislative Removal of a Director 
Less than two years following his interrogation by Oklahoma 
legislators, Lloyd Allen was among the ranks of the unemployed because 
his position as Director of the Department of Commerce and Industry 
.
24Personal interview with Representative Heber Finch, Jr. 
25Personal interview with Senator Robert Murphy. 
26The Daily Oklahoman, June 11, 1963. 
27Ibid., June 7, 1963. 
had been legislatively abolished. Allen had run directly into the 
"raw" power of the legislature in the early part:· of the Thirtieth 
Legislative Session when he requested a supplemental appropriation of 
$30,000 in order to complete the fiscal year. This presented the 
legislature with a golden opportunity to demonstrate its control over 
the Department. The eventual fate of the Department was forecasted 
by The Daily Oklahoman's .report "that the House Rules Committee re-
luctantly granted ... the ... $30,000 supplemental appropriation." 
However, the Committee said that its action was not to be interpreted 
as "condoning the mismanagement within the agency. 1128 
Governor Bellman's :reaction to Allen's request for additional 
funds indicates that by 1965 the Governor had become aware of the 
fact that the destiny of the Department was controlled by the legis-
lature. The press :reported that Governor Bellman was "irked" with 
Allen's need for a supplemental appropriation. 29 When quizzed about 
Mr. Allen's operation of the Department, the Governor replied, ''Allen 
made the big mistake of ignoring the legislature's cut in the 
Department's funds in 1963. 1130 
There are several sources which rather authoritatively indicate 
that the merging of the Department of Commerce and Industry with the 
Oklahoma Planning .and Resources Board was primarily ·intended as a 
means of removing Lloyd Allen from his post. Robert Wolf, assistant 
28rbid., March 11, 1965. 
29The Oklahoma City Times, July 23, 1965. 
30Persona1 interview with Governor Henry Bellman, 
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director of public information for the Department of Commerce and 
Industry at the time of the merger said, ''the merger was intended 
to get rid of Allen; it was probably 90 per cent political, 1131 
The candid remarks of two legislators who were coauthors of 
the merging legislation support Wolf's assessment: "The merger was 
aimed at legislating Allen out of a job, 1132 "It {the mergeE_/ was 
partly due to the desire to get rid of Allen and they {legislator~/ 
realized that {GovernoE] Bellman was not going to get rid of him, 1133 
Certainly the legislature's direct role in the selection and 
removal of Mr, Allen is not consistent with the model set forth in 
Chapter II. Industrial development is a technical function which 
should be controlled by the executive branch. However, the remarks 
of legislative and executive officials concerning.the origin of the 
merger and the rationale used in justifying their action is replete 
with illustrations which reveal an extensive degree of legislative 
"guidance" of this Department, 
Source of the Merger 
Both Governor Bellmon and Representative Lou Allard of Drumrigpt 
indicate that the initiative for the merger of the two executive 
agencies was with the legislature, Governor Bellman related that he 
had sent a message to the legislature requesting the establishment of 
31Personal interview with Robert Wolf, 
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32Personal interview with Representative Curtis Lawson, March 24, 
1966, Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
33Personal interview with Senator Robert Murphy, 
two new departments, a department of planning and d,evelopment and a 
department of parks and lodges; "however, the legislature completely 
34 ignored my proposals." When questioned concerning the origin of 
the merging legislat·ion, Representative Allard replied, "the merger 
. . . d b h 1 . 1 1135 was 1.n1.t1.ate y t e eg;i.s ature .... 
Legislative initia.tive also is .indicated by Representative 
Heber Finch,. Jr. 1 s rationale for the merger: "The Depa.rtment of 
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Commerce and Industry would have been abolished or severely emasculated 
36 
if it had not been merged. 11 From the outset the leg:islature had the 
upper hand. It was not a matter of whether it was going to change the 
s.tatus quo; rather it was a matter of how the Department would be 
altered. 
Rationale for Merger 
Legislators readily admit that the Department of Commerce and 
Industry was altered for the specific purpose of getting _rid of its 
director. They say that the decision to merge the Department with 
the Planning and Resources Board was completely ·legislative in 
origin. It is within legislative and executive officials' expla-
nations and justifications of the merger that the full extent of 
leg;i.slai:ive domination of the Department becomes .most obvious. 
The following explanations were offered as reasons: for the me,rger: 
"it was partly due to a rift between the legislature and the Governor. 
34Personal interview with Governor -Henry Bellman. 
35personal interview with Representative Lou Allard. 
36personal interview with Representative Heber Finch, Jr. 
{An effor!_/ to see which one controlled certain things. 113 J 
The merger had to take place because the legislature was 
determined that {the Department of/ Commerce and Industry 
was p.ot going to get any money to speak of. The House had 
let it be known that i 38was only going to appropriate a 
token amount of money. 
Actually the Senate was not in favor of the merger; however, 
it was a choice between being able to make an appropriation 
to a me.E_ged de:e_artment or nothing to the old department. 
J, D. LMcCarty_/ told me that I could write the appropriation 
if I chose to favor the House version of (he bill_;_ or if I 
chose to maintain the old department, he {McCarty_/ would 
cut off th3 appropriation to it. It was well-greased from 
the start, 9 
The last group of remarks are particularly significant since Senate 
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Bill 327 was referred to the House Rules and Procedures Committee which 
is chaired by Representative McCarty. Such procedure is irideed strange 
because it would normally be expected that proposals affecting in"-
dustrial development would be referred to the House Industrial 
Development Committee. There was no opportunity to pursue the reason 
for this action. However, it is commonly known among Oklahoma politi-
cal observers that Speaker McCarty exercises extensive control 
over the House of Representatives. Also, the remarks of several 
legislators indicate that the House leader assumed the major role in 
the merging action. 
It is within the context of the legislators' rationalizing of 
their removal of Allen as the Director of the Department of Commerce 
3 7Personal 1.' nterv1.' ew w1.· t·h R t · t · C t · L T 1 ·· ·· · epresen a 1.ve ur is · awson, u: ,sa., 
Okla,horna, Match 24, 1966. 
38 
Personal interview with Senator Robert Murphy. 
39 
Personal interview with Senator Ralph Rhoades of Tulsa, Tt.1:l:S:a, 
Oklaµama, April 20, 1966. Senator Rhoades was the principle author of 
Senate Bill 32 7, which merged the two agencies. 
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and Industry that not only the extent of the legislature's control over 
the Department but also their expectations of any executive department 
are made apparent. Many legislators leave the impression that they 
honestly think ,their action was correct, They view the merger of the 
Department as the proper thing to do since it brought about the removal 
of a man who was not suited for the demands of the job {within the 
guidelines of the legislatur~/. An excellent example of this attitude 
is provided by Senator Murphy's critique of Allen's operation of the 
Department: 
Allen had no conception of opening up for free exchange 
of ideas on how the Commerce and Industry Department 
should be run; he was not cooperative. He seemed to 
have the notion that Commerce and Industry was an executive 
matter--to Hell with the legislature, 40 
Whereas, other legislators summed up their opposition to Mr, Allen 
41 
with statements such as, "he didn 1 t understand Oklahoma's problems;" 
or, "I was never impressed with Allen. 1142 Consequently, Allen was 
removed. 
Legislative control over the Department is also indicated through 
the explanations of two individuals who were staff members of both the 
Department of Commerce and Industry and its successor, the Industrial 
Development and Park Department. Tom Daniel, who headed the Infor-
mation and research Division of the original Department and is 
currently holding a similar position with the Publicity, Advertising, 
and Information Division of the newly created Department, explained 
40 Personal interview with Senator Robert Munphy. 
41Personal interview with Senate President Pro Tempore, 
Clem Mcspadden of Claremore, April 19, 1966, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
42Personal interview with Representative Heber Finch, Jr, 
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that "the merging action was due to the legislature's displeasure with 
the personnel {of the Department of Commerce and Industry/ more than 
anything else." Elaboratin~ further, Daniel emphasized that 
Lloyd Allen "could not speak our {Oklahoma'~/ language. The political 
situation in the Northeastern part of the United States is more so-
phisticated than in Oklahoma. He was not attuned to the legis,-, 
43 lature." Daniel's remarks reflect an awareness of the demands of 
the Oklahoma legislature. His statements clearly indicate that the 
success of the director of an executive department is in large measure 
due to his ability to understand the "politics" of the Oklahoma legis-
lature. Such an interpretation is supported by the comments of 
Robert Wolf, who was a staff member of both of the Divisions headed 
by Mr. Daniel. Wolf related that Tom Daniel and Jay Casey, who was the 
Director of the Industrial Development Division of the Commerce and 
Industry Department during the administration of Lloyd Allen, were 
unofficially appointed to do Allen's legislative liason work. Wolf 
charges that Daniel and Casey "double-crossed" their director. 
Casey thought ~hat he was in line to get the new 
directorship /Industrial Development and Park De-
partment/ and-Daniel was going to take the Washing-
ton post /is associate director/;. Casey had {senator/ 
Gene Howa~d and /Senator Cle~-McSpadden, and-Daniel-
had built some s~pport. 44 -
Assuming Wolf's assessment. to be accurate, it appears that the 
Department of Commerce and Industry's division chiefs were well aware 
43Personal interview with Tom Daniel, who was in charge of the 
Information and Research Division of the Commerce and Industry De-
partment and currently is in charge of the Publicity and Promotion 
Division of Industrial Development and Park Department, March l, 
1966, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 
44Personal interview with Robert Wolf. 
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of the real source of power and were seeking to exploit it O On the 
other hand, if there is little or no validity in the details of 
Wolf's account~ his remarks clearly indicate that the legislature was 
recognized. by policy-making members of the staff as the source of 
control over the Departmento Both Daniel and Wolf express a common 
thought: The legislature played a very important role in the operation 
of the Department of Commerce and Industryo 
Evaluation of the Merger 
Particularly indicative of the extent of legislative domination 
over the Department of Commerce and Industry are the remarks made by 
legislators in regard to the wisdom of the merger, Several members 
of the legislature express judgments &imilar to that of Speaker 
Jo Do McCarty when he said, "there probably needs to be a separate 
45 
department for commerce and industry." Similarly~ Representative 
Curtis Lawson of Tulsa considers the merger of the industrial develop-
ment function with the recreational function to be completely un-
desirable O Lawson sai,d~ "it [the mergeE._/ is like putting labor and 
46 banking togethero" Yet he considered the primary end, the,removal 
of Lloyd Allen, to be worth the "expense 11 o Representative Lawson 
expressed his views as follows: 
I was in favor of getting rid of Allen, but I did not favor 
type of merger that took placeo I supported the Bill 
45Personal interview with J, D, McCartyo 
46P 1 . t . . th R t t. C O L ·m 1 ., . ersona 1.n erv1.ew w1. · epresen a 1.ve urt1.s awson, i:t.U. .sa, 
Okla p.dma , , Ma r·c'h 24.; 19 6 6 0 
/Senate Bill 327/ because the alternative would have been 
to do nothing.47 
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In short, the legislature was willing to impede, at least temporarily, 
the development of commerce and industry in order to remove a director 
which it considered to be "undersirable". 
In his evaluation of the merger, Speaker McCarty made a "guarded" 
predittion concerning the future of the State's industrial development 
agency. McCarty's prediction is clearly indicative of the nature of 
legislative control over the agency. McCarty said, 
this {the D~artment I s fu!_urJ depends to a great extent 
upon what {Representativ!:_/ Hutchins wants, which will be 
revealed in his "watchdog" or interium committee report 
and what happens in November /in. regard to the governor's 
rac'=l·. At the present time H;°rchins' committee indicates 
that it is unhappy with the operation of the present De,,-. 
partment. The legislature will probably clean out every-
body over there. /TyeT Bledsoe and /Charles/ Monroe48 
are going to go du;ing the next session.49 -
The Speaker's remarks are particularly significant in light of 
the fact that he has recently been re-elected by the House Democratic 
Party Caucus. 50 If McCarty possessed the ability to include Section 
XV which empowered the legislature to appoint the associate director, 
in Senate Bill 327, it is not too unreasonable to predict that he will 
4 7rbid. 
48 Both Bledsoe and Monroe are currently heading divisions .of the 
Industrial Development and Park Department. Bledsoe is the Director 
of the Division of Parks, Recreation, and Waterways; and Monroe holds 
the position of Director of the Division of Lodges. 
49Personal interview with Speaker J. D. McCarty. 
50 should McCarty win re-election from his Oklahoma county district, 
which is considered by most political observers to be a foregone con-
clusion, he will be the Speaker, since the Democratic Party has majority 
representation cinched due to the large number of uncontested seats. 
have a great deal to do with any decision of the next legislature to 
expand, separate, or consolidate the Industrial Development and Park 
Department. 
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Representative Lawson predicts that the next legislature will 
probably separate the functions of the former agencies once again. 
Thus, on the basis of these remarks it is indicated that legislative 
leaders believe that it is "proper" for them to play a direct role in 
the management of executive departments. Should a department get "out 
of line" it is the "responsibility" of the legislature to take whatever 
"corrective action" that it deems necessary. If this means that a 
director of the Department of Commerce and Industry must be 
legislatively relieved of his duties, then such will be the case. 
Specific Illustrations of Legislative Control 
By analyzing the actual legislation which merged the Department 
of Commerce and Industry with the Oklahoma Planning :and Resources 
Board, the nature of legislative management of an executive department 
becomes readily apparent. Upon examining the Bill it becomes obvious 
that the legislature has established a new department which is, at 
least, temporarily more "suitable" to the dominate political forces 
of Oklahoma. 
As discussed above, one of the primary reasons for the merging of 
the Department of Commerce and Industry was to get rid of its director, 
Lloyd Allen. Senate Bill 327 accomplishes this goal through the pro-
visions of Section VII which among other things includes the following 
statement: "No person shall be appointed Director who has not been a 
resident and a qualified elector in this State for a period of at least 
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three years preceding his appointment." Thus, with the passage of this 
measure, the legislature m.ade it impossible for Governor Be llmon to 
reappoint Lloyd Allen since he had only· resided within the State from 
the time of his appointment as Director in June of 1963. This was the 
first time that a residence requirement had been imposed on an official 
heading an executive department in Oklahoma. 
Perhaps one of the most outstanding examples of legislative 
domination of the Department of Commerce and Industry is the Bill's 
provision for an associate director, which is incorporated by Section 
XV: 
The Director is hereby authorized and directed to appoint 
a qualified associate Director, who shall be recommended 
by the Executive Committee of the State Legislative Council 
provided, however, if the Legislature is in session when 
said position is vacant, a six-member committee comprised 
of three members of the Senate, to be appointed by the 
President Pro Tempore, and three members of the House of 
Representatives, to be appointed by the Speaker, shall 
recommend said appointment. 
The Associate Director shall work full time and 
exclusively for the State of Oklahoma and it shall be his 
duty to maintain an office in Washington, D. C., to co-
ordinate the efforts of this office with the members of 
the Oklahoma Congressional Delegation .... 
Section XV has within it many significant implications, one of 
· - 51 
which is obvious legislative control of the agency. The legis-
lature is given the power to appoint the associate director, who 
could easily be an individual in direct conflict with the director, 
who is hired by the Industrial Development and Park Commission, which 
is appointed by the Governor. Thus, a situation could arise, under 
51other indications of this portion of the Act are discussed 
in the appropriate sections of this thesis. 
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the provisions of Section XV, whereby the legislature could appoint an 
individual to delibertly sabotage the Governor's attempt to set policy 
for the Department through his control over the actual appointment of 
the director. 
Legislative "guidance" of the Department is also illustrated 
through the rationale of legislators for the inclusion of Section XV 
in the merging legislation. Senator Clem Mcspadden, who was President 
Pro Tempore at the time of Senate Bill 327 1 s adoption which g5ve him 
partial control over the naming of the associate directorj rationalizes 
legislative control of the appointment in terms of his personal interest 
and responsibility: 
Our people are concerned with the development of the 
Catoosa area; I was doubtful as to what might happen 
to industrial development. We are more concerned with 
things of this nature than are other areas of the 
State.52 
While the reason given by Senator Murphy reflects a different type of 
rationale for including Section XV, it contains the comv:ion interest 
in legislative control which is manifested by Senator McSpadden 1 s 
statement. Murphy stated, "we want to prevent getting another 
Lloyd Allen. The legislature just thought that this was a real 
• 0 b "53 important JO •••• Both of these statements reflect an attitude 
that can be "sensed11 from a series of interviews with several in-
fluential legislators: If the legislature considers a position to be 
extremely important, then it becomes the responsibility of the 
legislature to do the hiring or to at least establish guidelines 
52 Personal interview with Senator Clem Mcspadden, 
53 Personal interview with Senator Robert Murphy. 
83 
which give the legislature virtual control over the actual hiringo 
Such ideas are often reflected by State senators in their attempt to 
rationalize their control of_various other state institutionso Senators 
feel a "personal responsibility" for giving primary "attention" to state 
institutions within their districtso Thus, within the minds of many 
legislators, they do not see their action as undue legislative control 
of 'an executive functiono In the primitive political environment 
of Oklahoma this is the legislature's responsibilityo 54 
Another specific example of the nature of legislative control of 
the State's industrial development agency is provided by the reaction 
to a recent proposal which was presented to a Legislative Council 
committee meeting concerning the future of industrial developmento 55 
The committee meeting was called on April 1, 1966, for the specific 
purpose of hearing Representative Curtis Lawson 1 s proposal suggesting 
that industrial development responsibilities be assigned to the office 
of the lieutenant governoro During the course of his presentation, 
Representative Lawson explained that it was his intention to give the 
governor the authority to delegate specific industrial development 
responsibilities to the lieutenant governor, In other words, it was 
Lawson 1 s aim to make the governor responsible for industrial development 
54For an elaborate explanation of this practice see: Lorenzo 
Tucker Gibson, Jro, "The Political Significance of the Oklahoma Merit 
System, 11 (unpub o Mo AO thesis, Oklahoma State University, 1963), pp o 10-
22 o 
55The remarks which are presented herein are based upon what 
transpired in a Legislative Council committee meeting in which the 
author was in attendance at Oklahoma Cityo 
through his being able to assign specific responsibilities to the 
lieutenant governor at any given moment • 
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.According to Representative .. Lawson I s explanation, one of the major 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of the Department of Commerce and In-
dustry was its lack of prestige among leading industrialists. -Lawson 
suggested that industrial firms could be expected to be much more re-
sponsive to the remarks of a field representative who they knew had 
direct connection with an office of greater significance than a 
department of commerce and industry. 
Whether or not Representative Lawson 1 s proposal was meritorious is 
of little significance. Rather, it was the committeevs response to his 
proposal which provides a vivid example of the nature of legislative in-
terest in controlling the executive agency. Without hesitation, Repre-
sentative Ed Cole responded to Lawson's proposal with a suggestion that 
the legislature rather than the governor should be the branch responsi-
ble:' £or~tJhe delegation of particular industrial development responsi·:,-,. 
bilities to the lieutenant governor. Although no formal vote was taken 
on either Lawson's or Cole's proposals, the concensus expressed through 
the remarks of other committee members definitely favored some form of 
legislative control. Lieutenant Governor Leo Winters, who had been ask-
ed to appear before the committee to offer his opinion concerning Repre-
sentative Lawson 1 s proposal, expressed agreement with Representative 
Cole's suggestion. In essence, Winters stated that Lawson's proposal 
was not sound because lieutenant governors sometimes become politi-
cally ambitious. Consequently, the Lieutenant Governor argued thatit 
would be better for the legislature to be responsible for determining 
the detailed delegation of responsibilities. 
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1._E!gislative Expectations of Executive Officials 
On the basis of their explanations and justifications of the 
merger, what do the members of the Oklahoma legislature expect from 
the director of a department such as the Department of Commerce and 
Industry? First, Oklahoma legislators expect executive officials to 
be people who are willing to cultivate a personal relationship be-
tween themselves and the legislatureo For example, Senator Mcspadden 
in his critic ism of Allen said that "he {Allef!/ never made any over-
tures to know legislators and their districtso 11§6 Mcspadden elaborated 
further by singling out Lloyd Rader, Director of the Oklahoma De-
partment of Public Welfare, as an illustration of his expectations. 
"Rader drops by to see if there is anything that he can do for youooo 
57 Allen was never seeno" Other legislators have expressed the same 
idea in different language: 11Robert Breeden. is the first director 
{;;,£ Oklahoma industrial development agencie~/ who has attempted to 
58 
communicate with legislators." Members of the legislature expect 
officials of the executive branch to maintain close contact with the 
legislatur~" Department heads must be able to at least cause legis-
lators to think that they appreciate legislative assistance and advice 
in the operation of their departments. 
56Personal interview with Senator Clem McSpaddeno 
58Personal interview with Senator Robert Murphy" 
Judging ~rom the comments of Senator Robert Murphy, legislators 
like to feel that they are "wanted" when they are dealing with a 
department head. Senator Murphy explains: "Legislators felt they 
were not wanted by the Allen ~eople. Allen had poor public relations 
with the legislature. 1159 Senator Murphy cited as a specific example 
an incident that occurred when he was meeting with members of the 
Governor's Economic Development Commission and Allen. When the meet-
ing adjourned for lunch, without inviting Senator Murphy, Allen told 
Murphy that he was going to have lunch with the Commissioners. 
Representative Lou Allardus explanation of Lloyd Rader's rapport 
with the legislature provides an excellent example of a department 
head who is aware of both the legislature's demand for "communi-
cation" and making legislators feel that they are "wanted". 
What he LRadeE_/ does is plant a seed with the legislature 
after he has made up his mind, He drops by legislators' 
offices asking if he can do something for them when he is 
actually just causing them to think that they originated 
the idea,60 
Legislators are well aware of the fact that,'.the legislature is 
the master of executive departments, Influential legislative members 
expect department heads to "recognize" legislative power, even if it 
means doing nothing other than "playing politics" in the manner cited 
in the Rader example, 
Legislators also expect an executive agency's director to 
understand and appreciate the legislator's need for political patron-
age. Legislators typically express such an idea by saying something 
59Personal interview with Senator Robert Murphy, 
60Personal interview with Representative Lou Allard. 
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such as, "I don't usually get involved in patronage; however, if I 
think that someone:,ls in need of a job I may ask for at least temporary 
employme.nt and I expect to get some· cooperation." According to 
Representative Lou Allard, political patronage does cause certain 
directors of executive agencies some degree of difficulty. 
Directors get pressure for part-time and unclassified 
J2_bs such; as:,weed.:,cutting, etc. Many of these people 
{department head~/ get into trouble~ turning up th~ir 
nose toward le gis la tors. When they_ [the legislatur~/ 
get people who will not give them any consideration, 
then the legislature usually gets fired up. 61 
Representative Allard is reiterating the thought central to many 
of the remarks cites above; legislators expect a department head to 
be more than just a good administrator. Legislators expect members 
of the executive branch to be aware of the nature of the state's 
political situation and to be willing to "cooperate" with a legis-
lator's effort to maintain himself as a part of that system. 
On the basis of the expectations of Oklahoma legislators, it is 
quite obvious that a successful director of the industrial development 
agency in Oklahoma must be one who is able to recognize and pro-
fessionally deal with the political forc~s at hand, namely, those of 
the Oklahoma legislature. .Likewise, judging from various evaluations 
of l.lloyd Allen 1 s performance, it is highly doubtful that he possessed 
the necessary political ability and finesse to deal with the "political 
jungle" which encompassed the Department of Commerce and Industry. 
Most legislators describe Allen as a nice guy, an honest man, or 
a sincere man. However, Allen's official employers the Governor and 
61 Ibid. 
the Chairman of the Economtc Development Commission, both expressed 
similar opinions concerning Allen's political ability. Governor 
Bellman said that the nt6est thing that could be said concerning 
Lloyd Allen.' s political competency would be to call him "a political 
novice 11 , 62 The Governor related how he had taken steps to work out 
an arrangement for a special meeting with certain key legislators 
after the Governor had become aware of the Department's need for a 
special appropriation, only to have his efforts thwarted by Allen's 
political ineptness. Governor Bellman said that at the very outset 
of the ~d hoc meeting Allen proceeded to "inform the legislators that 
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they were not going to play politics with his [Allen 1 ~/ department." 
Ed Malzahn, Chairman of the Industrial Development and Park 
Commission, reflected an evaluation of Allen's political ability which 
was very similar although not nearly as elaborate as that expressed by 
the Governor. When asked whether he believed Allen would have bean 
able to direct the Industrial Development and Park Department, which 
now encompasses recreation as well as industrial development, Malzahn 
replied, "there is much more politics involved in the operations of 
parks; this is where he would have had his most difficultyo 1164 Al-
though Malzahn did not elaborate any further, he definitely implied 
that Allen had difficulty with political situations. 
Based upon the remarks of several members of the Oklahoma 
legislature concerning the success of Lloyd Rader, as the Director of 
62Personal interview with Governor Henry Bellman~ 
64Personal interview with Ed Malzahn. 
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the State Department of Public Welfare, there is reason to believe that 
political astuteness is a necessary prerequisite to achieving success 
in any department of the executive branch in Oklahoma state government. 
Certainly the Department of Commerce and Industry, with its extensive 
history of political difficulty would be one of the most demanding 
departments. Thus,. within such a context the position may have been 
too much for Lloyd Allen to handle, 
Partisan Politics 
As has been stated above,. the merger of the Commerce and Industry 
Department with the PlanniJJ.g and Resources Board was partially designed 
for the purpose of removing Lloyd Allen from the Director's post •. 
There are several factors which indicate that this action may have been 
primarily partisan in nature. Mr. AUen was a Republican from Maine 
who was brought in at the request of Governor B~llmon, the State's first 
Republican governor, over the strong objections of an overwhelmingly 
Democratic legislature. 65 The presence of these circumstances in-
dicate that the decision to get rid of Mr. Allen through the process 
of legislation may have resulted from the partisan motivations of the 
Democratic leadership. 
It was during tl:e course of an interview with Senator Robert Murphy 
that partisan politics was first mentioned. Senator Murphy indicated 
that he -tHought Mr, Allen's operation of the Departmen was partially 
related to a partisan motivation. In explaining Allen's "negative" 
attitude toward the Democratic legislature Murphy expressed that it 
65see footnote 16, Chapter IV. 
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was his personal opinion "that Allen was under a great deal of pressure 
from people like Drew Mason66--that he [Alle~/ had a responsibility to 
build the Republican Party." Murphy continued by adding that "Allen 
might have been fooled by Bellman when he came to the State. He seemed 
to have the impression that the Republican Party had a great deal more 
power than it actually had. 1167 
The significance of Senator Murphy's statements stems riot from the 
extent or degree of their validity; rather, it is the fact that a 
Democratic legislator believed that Governor Bellman was either person-
ally, or through his personal assistants, injecting "Republican poli-
tics" into the operation of the Department: of Commerce and Industry. 
Consequently, the legislature could rationalize its opposition to 
Allen's management of the Department. 
Whether such an interpretation is valid or not, partisan politics 
did, in fact, enter into the Department of Commerce and Industry's 
relationship with the legislature. Particularly significant are the 
provisions of Section XV of Senate Bill 327 which merged the De-
partment with the Planning and Resources Board. It was Section XV 
which gave the legislature control over the appointment of the De-
partment's associate director. It is the legislator's explanations 
of Section XV which reveal the nature of the partisan motivations 
which entered into the merging action. Senator Rhoades, a Tulsa 
Republican who was one of the principle architects of Senate Bill 327 
66Mr. Drew Mason is an executive assistant to Governor Henry 
Bellman. 
67 Personal interview with Senator Robert Murphy. 
said: 
The Washington manus appointment by the legislature was 
i~sert~d in the House, apparently under the influence of 
LJ, D..:./ McCarty. McCarty made it in the form of an u1ti-
m~tum.,. I!, was a personal thing between McCarty and 
{GovernoE} Bellman. McCarty said that the only way .E:_O 
get anything from Bellman is to take it. Hell! he /Bellman 
doesn 1 t give you Republicans a damned thing, He wa;ts all 
the glory. McCarty said that he was tired of Bellmon 
"crapping" on the legislature,68 
Senator Rhoades' remarks are supported by the comments of other 
legislators who likewise indicate that a partisan motivation was 
involved~in the drafting and adoption of Section XV. Representative 
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Curtis Lawson remarked "without this attached to the Bill, the Com-
mittee would have killed it. 1169 Reflecting a similar kind of rationale, 
Senator Robert Murphy said, "the House was particularly interested in 
having some influence over this appointment. 11 Murphy continued, "'the 
Washington position is Senator LRoy_/ Boecher's pet job. If he wants 
70 it to remain, it pa:::obably will." 
Speaker J. D. McCartyus personal observations on the legislature's 
control of the aseociate director's posi~ion provide additian~l evi-
dence of the partisan considerations which entered into the legis-
lature's action, When the Industrial Development and Park Commission 
eventually made the selection of the associate director following an 
Attorney General's opinion which declared Section XV of Senate Bill 
68Personal interview with Senator Ralph Rhoades, 
69Personal interview with Representative Curtis Lawson, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, March 2:4, 1966. 
70Personal interview with Senator Robert Murphy. 
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327 to be unconstitutional, 71 McCarty retor~ed, "a Republican won't do 
72 
us much good up there." McCarty pursued a similar theme in a person-
al interview some months later. 
He LGovernor Bellmog/ should have appointed a man who could 
get along with the Oklahoma Democratic delegation and a 
Democratic Presid~nt. Perhaps if Eisenhower wer~ in the 
White House;i :;i;t /the appointment of a Republican/ might have 
been okay,7~ ~ -
McCarty's remarks bring out another reason for the legislature's 
control of the appointment of the Industrial Development and Park 
Department 1 s associate director. The legislature wanted to use the 
associate director as a liason between the Oklahoma Congressional 
delegatipn and the State legislature. Rep:resentative HeberFinch"' Jr. 
indicated that this was. one o;e tne ·.rhajor -reasons for the legislature's 
inclusion of Section XV in the Bill. "The legislature wanted a liason 
man between LouE) Congressmen and the S.tate legislature. They wanted 
to make a contact man for the legislature. They didn't want a 
Republican." 74 
Representative Finch added yet another partisan explanation for 
the legislature's decision to make the appointment of the Department 0 s 
number two man when he remarked, 
they Lthe legislatur~/ never would have established the 
post if they had known they could not make the appointment; 
because, the legislature feared that Bud Wilkinson would 
71According to the Oklahoma City Times, July 26, 1965, "the 
Attorney General ruled that provisions of_the bill providing that:that 
legislature 'recommen4 1 the appointment Lo£ the associate directoE) 
constitutes an encroachment of executive power by the:legislative 
branch of government." 
72Ibid. 
73 Personal interview with Speaker J. D. McCarty. 
74 Personal interview with Representative Heber Finch, Jr. 
be appointed in order that he might be kept in the 
~
1limelight'u to later run against /U, S, Senator/ 
Monroney. 75 - -
There is no indication as to the number of legislators who maintained 
views similar to those held by Finch; however, there is no doubt that 
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partisan motivation had much to do with Finc~ls voting for legislative 
control over the appointment of the Washington assistant. Fiµchus re-
marks must be given consideration since he is one of the senior members 
of the House, having first been elected in 1954. It is an established 
fact that some of the same type of thinking as that expressed by Repre-
sentative Finch was widespread enpugh to draw comment from the press. 
The Daily Oklahoman remarked: "Legislators wanted to control the 
appointment {of the associate directo.E_/ so a governor could not use 
76 
the Washington man as a campaign aid, 11 Thus, on the basis of the 
evidence presented it does seem safe to conclude that partisan moti-
vations definitely played a role in the adoption of Senate Bill 327 
through the provisions of Section XV. 
If this is true• why did the Republican Governor sign the Bill? 
It is highly probable that the ~gislature would have overridden a 
gubernatorial veto since little legislative opposition was expressed 
to any portion of the bill. Also, the Governor explained• that he. 
signed the bill after he had called the Attorney General's office and 
was told that Section XV would be unconstitutiona1.77 Consequently, 
75 Ibid. 
76The Daily Oklahoman, December 14, 1965. 
77Personal interview with Governor Henry Bellman. 
there was no need for Governor Bellman to get embroiled in an 
unnecessary conflict with the Democratic legislature. 
As indicated throughout this chapter~ the legislature completely 
dominated the operation and development of the various executive 
agencies relating to indusirial development. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Following the pattern of the more industrialized states, Oklahoma 
sought to encourage and promote industrial development in the state by 
establishing a full-time governmental department in February of 1955 
for promoting industrial development. Prior to the establi'shment of 
this separate agency, the promotion of industrial development had 
been one of the many functions of the Oklahoma Planning and Resources 
Board. Many: economic interests in the state desire ihi;'i.,dustrial de-
velopment, but there is a problem directly related to state government 
that seems to make it compelling. As a result of the increase in the 
demand for state services at a rat:e greater than the growth in the 
state's financial resources, it became necessary to seek new sources 
of revenue. Many legislators saw economic growth through industrial 
development as a method for increasing the State's tax base and conse-
quently its revenues, Thus, it was decided that the state .. should 
assume an aggressive role in the promotion of industrial deve~opment. 
To perform this role, the state development agency was raised to the 
level of a department--the Department of Commerce and Industry. 
The Departmeµt of Commerce and Industry was rather short lived. 
Although it was established with virtually unanimous legislative 
support arid rationalized on the basis of impil'.'oving the economic status 
of the people of the state, and increasing state revenues, within ten 
95 
96 
years this support had vanished. Following several unsuccessful 
attempts to alter the Department, it was eventually abolished by means 
of merging it with the Planning and Resources Board in June of 1965, 
After only ten years, the legislature had returned the agency to virtu-
ally the same status which it had prmor to the 1955 Act. 
Senate Bill 327, which once again combined these two executive 
agencies, seemed not to be primarily motivated by a desire to increase 
the efficiency of the industrial development effort. The primary ,. :.~, .. ,,.: 
problem reflected in the legislature's response to the Department 
relates to a political contest between the Governor and the Legislature, 
and to a question of competency of the directors;,of the Department, 
When the Department was first created, there was an extraordinarily 
close relationship between the legislature and the governor's office. 
However, with the election of J. Howard Edmondson in 1958, this rapport 
b d ~ . egan to etE}fiate. By 1961 the relationship between the legislature 
and the governor was so strained that it was difficult for these two 
branches to act jointly on constrictive issues confronting them. This 
legislative-executive hostility extended to all agencies under the 
direction of the governor. 
Although the industrial development agency was technically under 
the supervision and control of the Governor's Economic Development Com-
mission, the legislature was aware of the reality that it was the 
governor who directed the agency. Consequently,the legislature 
assoicated Max Genet's direction of the agency with Governor Edmondson. 
Genet did not improve the general legislative attitude toward the 
Department when it was learned that he had deposited Departmental 
funds to his personal account. Nor was the legislative hostility 
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toward the Department moderated with Governor Bellman's selection of 
Lloyd Allen, a New England Republican, as Genetus successor. Allen 
did not successfully relate to the Legislature, though he was de-
pendent upon it for appropriations. Legislators looked upon him as 
being a "foreigner", and considered him to be politically incompete_nt. 
They abolished the Department, to get rid of him. 
The problem is more basic than a conflict of personalities, 
however. Since the promotion of industrial development also has been 
an activity of local chambers of commerce, perhaps there was no deeply 
felt need in either branch of government for the creation of a function-
ing department level agency. Rural political forces dominated the 
legislature during the period of time considered in this study, though 
urban political pressures were significant on the state political 
scene. No doubt Governor Gary, who provided the leadership necessary 
for establishing the Department of Commerce and Industry, was merely 
appealing to urban political forces for support in his bid for state-
wide political office. He was fortunate in having solid legislative 
support for his programs. Whereas, Governor Edmondson, coming from 
the city {Tuls§:/, did not enjoy a stable political backing in the rural 
dominated legislature. In fact, he soon became embroiled in conflict 
with the legislature"over the reapportionment issue which threatened 
the power base of the legislative leadership. Bellman, a Republican, 
who probably was elected in part because of division in the Democratic 
Party,• could naturally expect to have difficulty with a legislature 
dominated by the Democratic Party. Certainly Edmondson, a city 
Democrat:_and Bellman a rural Republican, were unable to provide the 
necessary leadership to create a functioning Department. Both of these 
men demonstrated a lack of political astuteness in their unwise 
appointments to the Directorship of the Department of Commerce and 
Industry for which they must be held responsible. The legislature, 
already sensitive to activities of the executive for rather basic 
political reasons, was provided a ready-made rationalization for 
merging the Department with the Planning and Resources Board. 
The creation of a functioning department of government requires 
a broad base of political support. The department being created must 
satisfy fundamental needs of the society,and above all, appeal to the 
various political forces on which its life depends. A competent 
leadership is required to guide the development of the organization 
created to provide the new function of government. Certainly, the 
governor, who confronts the day-to-day needs of the political com-
munity, must provide this leadership in a state; but the legislature 
must be responsive and constructive which, of course, means that it, 
too, senses the problems involved and desires solutions for them. 
This study reveals that there has been a deficiency in executive 
leadership, and an inadequacy in legislative response to the problem 
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of promoting industrial development in the state, The attempt to 
establish a state development agency has brought to the surface 
political conflicts that have nullified the effect. A sensitive 
legislature, required to authorize the basic structure, and provide the 
appropriations necessary for its functioning, has frequently changed 
the structure, starved the organization in its appropriations, and has 
interfered with its management. Because of this, the Department of 
Commerce and Industry was never able to become an established 
institution of Oklahoma government. 
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Members of the Oklahoma legislature believe that they must control 
the industrial development agency if it is to function 1'effective_ly"o 
They reflect, in their comments, a distrust of the Governor's capa-
bility in guiding the agency so that the interests of all localities 
in the state will benefit £ran its activities o The rural legislators 
are particularly concerned with this problemo Legislative consideration 
of Representative Curtis Lawson's pvoposal to assign industrial develop-
ment responsibilities to the lieutenant governor provides an outstanding 
illustration of the rural-urban conflict" The statements of Lieutenant 
Governor Leo Winters, who had been asked to appear before the Legis-
lative Council Committee as a witness, convey the typical thinking of 
the~legislatureo In his evaluation of the L~wson proposal Winters re-
marked, "keeping the throttle in the legislature is goodo You might 
get a man who means well but is not in line with the ideas of the 
'outlying areas', who might spend money unwiselyo"l Lieutenant Gover-
nor Winters continued to explain how a good effective industrial de-
velopment department must have something to keep it "attuned to the 
2 people on the local level}' Dean Richard Poole's comments on Allen's 
problems with the legislature supports thiso Explaining the legis-
lature's intense hostility toward Lloyd Allen, Dean Poole remarked, 
"Allen ran into hostility due to the fact that he was both a Re-
publican and a Yankeeo Thec(ll!]lbination of the two was just too much 
for a rurally oriented legislatureo 113 
1Legislative Council lttdus:tria:l illeve·lop]Ile'nt :Corrimittee, ,Me:etirig,., 
April L, T966.,, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma" 
2rbid. 
3Personal interview with Dean Richard Pooleo 
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The 1965 legislation illustrates the legislature's interest in 
dominating the development agency, Specifically, it provided that the 
Oklahoma Legislature appoint the Associate Director, .This, would 
assure the Democratically dominated legislature that a Democrat would 
be appointed to this position even if there was a Republican Governor. 
It would also ensure the legislative leadership a voice in the 
functioning of the agency. 
While fundamental political conditions necessary for the creation 
of a functioning industrial development agency have not existed in 
Oklahoma, nevertheless, three different structures have been attempted. 
None of these three organizations have been adequately structured to 
in~ulate the tebhnical operation from undue political interference. 
This study did not give much attention to the Division of Industrial 
Development and State ·Planning which was under the supervision of the 
Planning and Resources Board. Research revealed that it was not very 
active. The concern of this study focused on the Commerce and Industry 
Department which was created in 1955, and the Industrial Development 
and Park Department which was created in 1965. 
The Commerce and Industry Department conformed more closely to 
the model industrial development agency elaborated upon in Chapter II, 
than does the Industrial Development and Park Department. The basic 
legal structure of the Department of Commerce and Industry was quite 
comparable to the model agency. Ostensibly, the Director was to be 
chosen through a Commission which was appointed by the governor. How-
ever, the basic weakness of the Oklahoma agency stemmed from the 
"politics" emanating from the nature of the Commission. Although 
the State Economic Development Act of 1955 provided for the development 
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of a staggered expiration of terms feature, it did not immediately 
serve to,:free the Department from political struggles. The Governor's 
Economic Development Commission was directly identified with the 
particular governor in office, Actually, under the provisions of the 
Act it would be February, 1967, before the entire Commission's member-
ship would no longer be controlled by one particular governor. 4 As 
provided by the legislation creating the Commission, the entire member-
ship of the initial Commission was to be appointed by Governor Gary. 
Some of these members were to have served until 1961. Following the 
1961 alteration of the Commission, six new members were appointed to 
serve until February, 1963. In February, 1963, Governor Bellmon 
appointed six members to the Commission. Although two of the Com-
missioners' terms expired in February of 1965, Governor Bellmon, or 
whoever may have become governor in 1963, would in fact control the 
entire membership of the Commission until February of 1967. Conse-
quently, the Commission, which was theoretically estabiished for the 
purpose of removing the direction of the State's industrial develop-
ment agency from partisan politics, was often looked upon by members 
of the legislature as nothing other than a political tool of the 
governor. Thus, the legislature was not hesitant in deciding to 
alter or abolish the industrial development agency. 
It is believed that the Oklahoma development agency may have 
become more vulnerable to "political manuevering" due to the absence 
of a bi-partisan membership requirement as is provided for in the 
4oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes 1961, Title 74, sec. 675. 
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model agency. It should be noted that the Commission did not get 
involved in "political bickering" until the l,egislature and the Gover-
nor became involved in a political struggle. When the feud between the 
legislature and Governor J, Howard Edmondson became extremely in-
tense in 1961, the conflict extended to the industrial development 
agency. This is indicative of the fundamental nature of the weakness 
of the law creating the Department of Commerce and Industry. There 
should never be such a close relationship between the operation of a 
technical agency and the degree of harmony or conflict between the 
executive and legislative branches. 
The Oklahoma Industrial Development and Park Department in 
contrast to the model agency combines industrial development' with other 
functions of state government. Particularly significant is the fact 
that the Oklahoma agency is also responsible for the management of 
state parks. On the basis of the remarks of legislators interviewed 
during the course of this stud~ state parks are usually considered to 
be within the political domain of the legislators. Parks are one of 
the few things which provide the legislator with ta~g~ble evidence of 
his concern for the "home folks". Although the operation of parks may 
appear to be a trivial matter, it may become very important to the 
legislator when confronted by a challenge for his job. Consequently, 
with the management of state parks intermingled with industrial de-
velopment, the chances for the direct involvement of "legislative 
politics" is rather great. Should a problem of major proportion 
arise due to the operation of these recreational facilities, it could 
serve to jeopardize the future of the entire development agency. 
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A more subtle weakness is that which stems from the lack of a 
bi-partisan requirement in the law creating the Oklahoma agency. 
Senate Bill 327 did not place a bi-partisan requirement on the gover-
nor's appointment of Commission members. Under the law establishing 
the Department, Commissioners' terms are to expire so that eventually 
one governor does not appoint the entire membership. However, when 
the original commission is. created the governor makes all of the 
initial appointments. Since there is not a bi-partisan requirement, 
the governor usually appoints commissioners of the same political 
party" Such practice causes critics to view the commission as nothing 
other than a political parking-ground of the governor. For example, 
one critic of the present Commission labeled it as "a bunch of small-
town Republicans. 115 Because of attitudes such as this, the legislature 
has not hesitated to interfere with the commission. This results in 
the creation of a situation in which the industrial development agency 
is unable to escape the vicious cycle of partisan politics. 
Perhaps one answer to the problem stated above lies in the 
establishment of a statutory bi-partisan governing board or com-
mission, as provided by the model agency and as has been estaplp;shed 
by some of Oklahoma's neighbors. 6 Such:a requirement could give the 
industrial development agency an opportunity to establish a tradition 
which is other than political in nature. An effective industrial 
'development agency will become a reality-,when it is recognized for its 
te~hnical competency. 
5Personal interview with Robert.Wolf" 
6s ,,. 23·· , upra, p.,,i. . • ,. 
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The governor can play a major role in altering the image of the 
state development agency. The governor should be more politically 
astute in his appointments so that persons are appointed who are not 
so objectionalbe to the legislature, Unless the Commission, which is 
responsible for the selection of the Director, is able to relate to 
the domin:i:i,te political forces of the legislature, it is unlikely that a 
~irector who is capable of coping with such potent force will be 
appointed. 
Another weakness lies in the fact that the Commissions' power to 
appoint the Director~~curtailed by the statutory three-year residence 
requirement. Although this does not give the legislature control of 
the appointment, it does subject the executive branch to an extra-
ordinary limitation- which is inconsistent with the basic objective of 
the model agency--the establishment of a politically ind~p~ride.nt 
development agency. 
The functioning of both the Department of Commerce and Indusj:py 
and the Industrial Development and Park Department has served to in,,,. 
crease their vulnerability to legislative hostility. These agencies 
have placed!_·primary emphasis on the promotional-personal contact 
method of operation rather than the more indirect "supplementary-
.supporting" approach employed by successful agencies such as the 
Texas Industrial Commission. 
It was extensive travel which became the target of the legislature 
in the case of the Department of Commerce and Industry. As expressed 
by a former staff member, "the Department got to looking too much 
toward bringing industry from New York and Chicago--the big headline 
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stuff." Representative Curtis Lawson, who attributes the failure of 
the Department of Commerce and Industry directly to what he labels as 
its attempt to pursue a "futile goal," said, 
they were running around the country trying to bring in 
industry. The Commerce and Industry Department or no 
other such department will ever be able to accomplish 
such a feat. There are only 1,500 new plants ~tarted 
each year with approximately 5,000 cities going after 
them. The law of averages runs against getting these. 
If the Commerce and Industpy Department gets one in-
dustry a year, it would be getting a fair pe~centage. 
However, the legislature will never tolerate such ex-
tensive expenditures by a department accomplishing such 
meager:.results. 8 
The promotional approach makes the industrial development agency 
vulnerable to legislative attack from two different angles. First, as 
indicated above, legislators often become critical of money being spent 
for matters such as the entertainment of corporate executives. It 
is often rather popular with the "home folks" for a legislator to in-
dulge in a bit of demagoguery when.it concerns money being spent in 
"swank, dim-lighted New York night clubs." Secondly, with the de-
partment directly involved in the contacting of industrialists, it 
becomes subject to charges of wavoritism when a firm locates somewhere 
other than within a particular legislator's district. 
On the basis of the remarks of individuals directly involved in 
state government, legislative interference with the attempts to es-
tablish an effective industrial development agency has resulted in a 
general lack of confidence in the Oklahoma agency. Thd.s has .resulted 
in the creation of a situation in which it has become extremely 
7Personal interview with Robert Wolfo 
8Personal interview with Representative Curtis Lawson, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, March ·24, 19660 
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difficult to attract competent personnel to the agency. Consequently, 
the State's industrial development effort continues to find itself 
"locked" in a vicious cycle of ineffectiveness. 
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